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ABSTRACT
INFANTS' UNDERSTANDING OF PHYSICAL PHENOMENA: A PERCEPTUAL HYPOTHESIS
SEPTEMBER, 1997
THOMAS HAROLD SCHILLING, B.S., FITCHBURG STATE COLLEGE
A.L.M., HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Ph . D
. ,
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Rachel K. Clifton
Piaget (1953) believed object permanence emerges through a series
of stages at approximately 18-months. Contemporary researchers have
suggested infants achieve object permanence by 3.5-months . A series of
studies by Baillargeon (1987) utilized a violation-of-expectation
paradigm habituating infants to a paddle moving 180°. During test
trials, a block was positioned in the path of the paddle. During
"possible" trials, the paddle moved 120°, stopped at the block and
returned. During the "impossible" trials, the paddle moved 180°,
seemingly through the block. Infants looked longer at the impossible
events suggesting an understanding that one object cannot occupy the
space of another object contiguously. Looking times could not be
explained by detecting perceptual novelty because the impossible event
was the more familiar of the test events.
Hunter and Ames (1988) have demonstrated that infants
look longer
at familiar stimuli if they have not thoroughly
encoded habituation
stimuli. These researchers believed that habituation
is a function of
time, age, and task difficulty. The current
research examines the
possibility that infants look longer at impossible
events because these
events are perceptually familiar. To test
whether infants had
VI
sufficient opportunity to encode habituation events using the moving
paddle paradigm, the number of habituation trials and infants' age were
manipulated
.
Four-month-olds who received 7-180° habituation trials looked
longer at the 180° test event (a significant familiarity preference)
.
Four-month-olds receiving 7-112° habituation trials looked longer at the
112° test event (a significant familiarity preference) . Four-month-olds
receiving 12-180° habituation events looked significantly longer at the
112° test event (a significant novelty preference) . A group of 6-month-
olds habituated to 7-180° trials showed no preferential looking during
the test trials. For the four-month-olds, looking times during the test
trials were a function of the type of familiarity event and whether
there were enough trials to fully encode the habituation events.
Looking time was not necessarily a function of an inferred violation of
physics. Performance on the moving paddle paradigm might be more easily
explained by perceptual mechanisms.
VII
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
An important issue in developmental psychology is how and when
cognitive abilities emerge. Two contrasting theories have been
developed to address this issue. One view championed by Spelke (e.g.,
Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992) maintains that
perception and understanding of the world is partly innate. According
to this view, the brain has evolved to such a point that perceptual
constraints are already built into the brain and that an understanding
of physical phenomena is simply an emergent quality of the brain.
An alternative view is that the infant develops an understanding
of physical phenomena by actively interacting with its environment
(Piaget, 1953; 1954; Aslin and Smith, 1988; Gopnik, 1996). As neural
functioning develops, the infant can utilize increasingly sophisticated
resources such as long-term memory, greater attention span, recall
abilities, and even conscious reasoning to understand his/her world.
The innate view, rooted in the nat'ivist philosophical
tradition of
Descartes, Liebniz, and Kant, tends not to be developmental;
perceptual
abilities are simply part of the brain, and the role o£
the world is to
trigger this latent knowledge. The interaction
view relating to the
empiricism of Locke, Newton, and Helmholtz requires
a greater
developmental explanation of how perception and
cognition emerge. Such
a view demands explanations of how
understanding develops, of what
mechanisms are used to synthesize contiguously
occurring events, of what
1
changes during infancy, and of how previously acquired abilities lead to
greater perceptual and cognitive abilities.
The pendulum in developmental psychology, as in philosophy, has
swung from strong empiricist accounts of development (i.e., Watson and
Skinner) to strong claims of innate knowledge (Chomsky and Spelke)
.
Such oscillations are important for any discipline. The field tends to
extract and maintain what is beneficial from every theory while
rejecting extreme ideas. Few contemporary psychologists are as rabid
behaviorists as Watson and Skinner, yet one cannot dismiss the
importance of classical conditioning and operant conditioning for
understanding behavior. The following dissertation stresses the
influence of the empiricist roots of philosophy on psychology; infants
may be active participants in their perceptual and cognitive
development, and the results of current empirical research may not
necessarily be pointing towards a precocious understanding of the world
2
CHAPTER II
THE PHILOSOPHICAL ROOTS OF PERCEPTION AND KNOWLEDGE
One of the great issues in western philosophy is the debate about
the origins of knowledge. The naive individual is struck by the
existence of a world of objects which one can see, as long as the eyes
are open and there is sufficient light. The objects move and one moves,
yet one continues to see a stable, organized world. Also, one can see
forms and colors and can perceive in the absence of objects by relying
on memories.
These are simple, obvious observations. However, the history of
philosophy testifies to the difficulty of finding acceptable accounts of
how ordinary percepts develop. Does all the information necessary for
accurate perception exist in the external world, or does one bring
expectations and knowledge to the perceptual encounter? One sees the
world in three-dimensions, but how does an upside-down two-dimensional
image on one's retina serve as the starting point for the upright three-
dimensional perception? Why do optical illusions persist even after
they have been recognized as such? How do various visual
images ana
impressions relate to thinking? Are they thoughts in themselves,
do
they provide the vehicles of thought, do they reflect
the manipulation
of symbolic entities, or are they epiphenomena?
These questions are
posed not only by philosophers, but also by
psychologists who are
interested in the emergence of perception and
cognition in early
infancy
.
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—The Rationalists
The ancient Greeks modeled knowledge upon vision. They strove to
understand how one comes to know the visible world and how this
knowledge contributes to more abstract ideas such as justice, beauty,
and ethics (Jones, 1969 a) . In the Timaeus (45 C, Cornford)
,
Plato
(1959) declared that the eye receives coalescing rays of light from
objects, but the soul makes perception possible. Similarly, Descartes
believed that all perception occurs in the mind and placed very little
importance on sensory organs. In Meditations (1641; trans. 1963),
Descartes established his certain and irrefutable position (or so he
thought) that he exists as a thinking being, attacked the claim that the
senses are the source of real knowledge and began to establish what
ideas are innate. Perhaps the most famous example of Descartes
establishing innate ideas is the "wax example."
Let us begin by considering the commonest of matters, those whiuh
we believe to be the most distinctly comprehended, to wit, the
bodies which we touch and see; . . .Let us take, for example, this
piece of wax: it has been taken quite freshly from the hive, and
it has not yet lost the sweetness of the honey which it contains;
it still retains somewhat of the odour of the flowers from which
it has been culled; its colour, its figure, its size are apparent;
it is hard, cold easily handled, and if you strike it with the
finger it will emit a sound. Finally all the things which are
requisite to cause us to distinctly to recognize a body, are met
within it. But notice that while I speak and approach the fire
what remains of the taste is exhaled, the smell evaporates,
the
colour alters, the figure is destroyed, the size increases,
it
becomes liquid, it heats. Scarcely can one handle it,
and when
one strikes it, no sound is emitted. Does the same
wax remain
after this change? We must confess that it remains;
none would
ludge otherwise? What then did I know so
distinctly in this piece
of wax? ^ It could certainly be nothing of all
that the senses
brought to my notice since all of these things
which fall under
taste smell sight, touch, and hearing are
found to be changed,
and yet the same wax remains... We must then
grant that I could not
even understand through the imagination what
this piece^o wa
and that it is my mind alone which perceives
it (PP- 50-bl).
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In this clever example, Descartes demonstrated what the five
senses reveal about the nature of the wax; when he subjects the wax to
the fire, he shows that every characteristic of the wax changes. He
then reminded the reader that he knows it is the same wax, but how can
we know this if the senses tell us the opposite? Where do we get the
concept of "sameness?" According to Descartes, it cannot be from the
senses because their data are constantly in flux. Descartes believed
that the concept of "sameness" (more formally the concept of identity)
must be an innate idea because it cannot be derived from observation.
We are born with the knowledge of the principle of identity, A = A.
This knowledge is absolutely necessary; is an a priori truth; and is
presupposed by any other knowledge. If we did not know this truth, we
could not know any truth.
The wax example also generates the innate idea of material
substance. According to Descartes, this idea cannot be derived from the
senses alone. Imagine NASA’s Mars probe which has sensors to detect
tactile, visual, and auditory data from the surface of Mars. The
machine is able to perform analyses to determine the types of minerals
and the temperature of the planet, etc., and it can send these
data back
to Earth. The machine would be able to determine attributes
(e.g.,
carbon-based, capable of locomotion, soft), but it would not
be able to
determine if life has been discovered without the concepts
of identity
(this is the same as what?) and substance (what is
this thingness?),
it did have these concepts, then it would be
able to organize the
sensorial data into a coherent picture of the
world.
5
B. The Empiricists
There is a long-standing tradition in philosophy that perception,
especially touch and vision, provides undeniably true knowledge.
Philosophers have generally sought certainty and have often claimed it.
In contrast, scientists, who are accustomed to their theories being
modified and upset by new data, generally settle for an interpretation
that encompasses the greatest amount of data in the simplest and most
elegant manner. Philosophers depend on the certainty of knowledge from
the senses because of the need to secure premises for their arguments
for experience. Scientists, on the other hand, are used to errors in
measurement and observation by instruments, and have consequently found
it necessary to repeat experiments; they do not readily expect
reliability from the senses. Indeed, many scientific instruments have
been developed precisely because of the limitations of the senses and
the unreliability of perception. Furthermore, it is easy to produce and
demonstrate many kinds of dramatic illusions which could hardly occur if
perception constituted direct reliable knowledge.
However, with the emergence of empiricism in philosophy, there
became a greater interest in the separation of sense data from
perception and in how sense data become combined by the mind to form
percepts. Such a philosophical view might be compared to
present
theories of bottom-up processing for perception and
cognition.
1 . The Empiricism of Locke
The first modern statement of empiricism
appeared in the Essa '
^n^ninn Human nndsust.andung (1690, 1990) by English Physician and
6
philosopher John Locke who wanted to apply the law of parsimony and to
rid philosophy of positing innate ideas in building theories of
epistemology. Locke's main epistemological thesis is put forth in the
following passage:
Let us suppose the mind to be, as we say, a blank slate ( tabula
rasa) of white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas;
how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store,
which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with
almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason
and knowledge? To this I answer in one word, from experience: In
that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately
derives itself (Bk. 2, Chap. 1, Sec. 2).
In order for Locke to establish the theory that the mind is a
blank slate, he would have to refute the rationalists' arguments that
knowledge is based on innate ideas. To this end he states:
The way shown how we come by any knowledge, sufficient to prove it
not innate. It is an established opinion among some men that
there are in the understanding certain innate principles; some
primary notions, . . .characters, as it were, stamped upon the mind
of man which the soul receives in its very first being and brings
into the world with it. It would be sufficient to convince
unprejudiced readers of the falseness of this supposition, if I
should only show. . .how men, barely by the use of their natural
faculties, may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the
help of any innate impressions, and may arrive at certainty,
without any such original notions or principles (Bk. 1, chap. 2,
sec . 1 ) .
In the rest of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding , Locke
elaborates on the simple idea of the blank slate and develops his theory
of knowledge. Locke begins by making several distinctions: the
distinction between simple and complex ideas, another between particular
and general ideas, and a third between primary and secondary
qualities.
a. Simple and Complex Ideas
Locke believed simple ideas are those that cannot
be further
analyzed into simpler components such as the
ideas of "solidity" or
7
purple
.
All such ideas are derived from experience in the world via
the senses.
Complex ideas are (1) compounds of simple ideas (e.g., beauty,
gratitude, the universe), (2) ideas of relations (e.g., larger than,
smaller than) created by setting two ideas next to each other and
comparing or contrasting them, or (3) abstractions, where the mind
separates out a feature of an idea and generalizes it (e.g., bluntness).
Abstractions are formed when we recognize a certain characteristic that
a group of objects has in common. That characteristic is assigned a
name, which is a symbol for that characteristic.
b. Primary and Secondary Qualities
According to Locke, primary qualities were characteristics that
necessarily inhered in mutual bodies. They comprised: solidity,
extension, figure, motion or rest, and number." Secondary qualities
were defined as "such qualities, which in truth are nothing in the
objects themselves but powers to produce various sensations m us by
their primary qualities, that is, by the. bulk, figure, texture,
and
motion of their insensible parts, as colors, sounds, tastes,
etc. (Bk.
2, chap. 8, sec. 10)
Our ideas of primary qualities are correct ideas
according to
Locke. That is, these ideas are caused in our
minds by those qualities
and these ideas correctly represent those
qualities . On the other hand
the ideas we have of secondary qualities
do not oorrectly represent the
world. Locke stated -...the ideas of
primary qualities of bodies are
resemblances of them, and their patterns do
really exist in the bodres
8
themselves; but the ideas produced in us by these secondary Qualities
have no resemblance of them at all. There is nothing like our ideas o:
existing in the bodies themselves." (Bk. 2, chap. 8, sec. 15)
This epistemological view is known as representative realism. It
holds that there is a real world "out there," and it is representative
because the mind does not have to give direct access to reality.
Rather, the mind represents reality in much the same way a photograph
does. Just as some characteristics of a photo correctly represent the
world (e.g., number, shape, relative size, etc.), some features of the
mind correctly represent the world (our ideas of primary qualities)
.
Furthermore, just as some characteristics of a photo are purely features
of the photo (e.g., its black and white presentation, its two-
dimensionality, its glossiness, etc.), the features of the mind pertain
only to the mind and not to the world (our ideas of secondary
qualities )
.
c. Substances
In western philosophy, "substance" has traditionally been the
term
naming whatever is thought to be the most basic independent
reality.
Aristotle defined substance as whatever can exist independently
of otter
things, so that a horse or a man (Aristotle’s examples)
can exist
independently, but the color of the horse or the
size of the man cannot.
The 17th and 18th century rationalists
took the idea of substance as
independent being so seriously that one of
their members, Spinoza,
claimed there could be only one substance
in the world (i.e., only one
9
thing)
,
namely, God, because only God could exist independently
(Copleston, 1960; Jones, 1969b)
.
With the distinction between simple/complex ideas and
primary /secondary qualities, Locke believed he provided a simple,
parsimonious theory of knowledge. However, Locke had difficulty in
explaining the key philosophical category of substance.
Our Obscure Idea of Substance in General. So that if anyone will
examine himself concerning his notion of pure substance in
general, he will find he has no other idea of it at all, but only
a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities which
are capable of producing simple ideas in us... If anyone should be
asked, 'What is the subject wherein colour or weight inheres?' he
would have nothing to say but, 'The solid extended parts.’ And if
he were demanded, "What is it that solidity and extension inhere
in?" he would have nothing to say but, 'The solid extended
parts.' And if he were demanded, 'What is it that solidity and
extension inhere in?' he would not be in much better case than
the Indian. . .who, saying that the world was supported by a great
elephant, was asked 'what the elephant rested on?' to which his
answer was, 'A great tortoise'; but being again pressed to know
what gave support to the broadbacked tortoise, replied - something
he knew not what (Bk. 2, chap. 23, sec. 2)
.
The fact that Locke was unable to describe substance ("something I
know not what") seems to pose a large problem to his epistemology,
although he did not seem to realize this in the Essay (Jones, 1969b) .
Once one introduces the metaphysics of substance (i.e., once one accepts
that given anything in the world, it is either a substance or a
characteristic of substance) , then one has to be prepared to render a
coherent account of substance. Locke fails on this account, and this
very issue of substance opened the door for Descartes to posit
substance
as being an innate idea.
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2^. Berkeley ' s Extension of Locke
Berkeley thought that Locke's errors about the origins of
knowledge could be remedied by attacking the notion of material
substance that put Locke into a philosophical quagmire. In his Essay
.
Locke had written: "Since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings,
hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or
can contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant
about them" (Bk. 4, chap. 1, sec. 1). Berkeley realized that if this
statement were literally true, then it is impossible to know something
that is not an idea. But Locke had claimed that we know that many of
these ideas are caused by real things in the physical world (material
substances) and particularly by their primary qualities, which have the
power to produce the ideas of both primary and secondary qualities in
our minds
.
Berkeley initially demonstrated Locke's apparent self-
contradiction by undoing the primary- secondary quality distinction.
Berkeley argued that primary and secondary qualities are really the same
£hing. How does one establish the size and shape of a table except by
looking at it or feeling it? The first act produces the secondary
qualities of color, and the second act produces the secondary qualities
of tactile sensation. One knows the size and shape of the brown
cable
by contrasting the brown of the table against the white of
the wall, and
the tan of the rug by running one's hand along its
surface and noting
where the sensations of smoothness and resistance end.
Our ideas of
primary qualities are really nothing more than
interpretations or
secondary qualities. According to Berkeley, all
of our ideas (except
11
for God and self) are nothing but ideas of secondary qualities or
interpretations of them. In a Treatise Concerning the Principle-, r,
t
Human Knowledge (1710. 1990), Berkeley wrote:
It is evident to anyone who takes a survey of the objects of human
knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the
senses, or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions
and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas formed by help of
memory and imagination, either compounding, dividing, or barely
representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways. By
sight I have the ideas of light and colour with their several
degrees and variations. By touch I perceive hard and soft, heat
and cold, motion and resistance... smelling furnishes me with
odours; the palate with tastes; and hearing conveys sounds to the
mind in all their variety of tone and composition. And as several
of these are observed to accompany each other, they come to be
marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one thing. Thus, for
example, a certain colour, taste, smell, figure, and consistence
having been observed to go together are accounted one distinct
thing, signified by the name "apple"; other collections of ideas
constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things;
which, as they are pleasing or disagreeable, excite the passions
of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth (part 1, Sec. 1)
.
This passage captures almost all of Berkeley's epistemology. Like
Descartes, Berkeley attempts to start with what is certain (i.e., what
is given) . For Berkeley, what is certain are ideas of secondary
qualities which he calls ideas or sensations (known as sense-data)
.
Infants come into the world with certain given sense-data: colors,
sounds, tastes, odors, and tactile sensations. These data do not
constitute a world for the infant; rather, they comprise a chaos of
fluctuating sensations (similar to James' notion of the infant's world
as a "blooming, buzzing, confusion") During the course of infancy,
the
infant learns to read these data and make sense of the world by
recognizing patterns of contiguously-occurring events and by
learning
language
.
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a. Sources of Sense Data
Both Descartes and Locke believed that sense-data are caused by
substances "out there," which in turn are caused by God (they both tried
to argue that substances are caused by an infinite series of causes -
the table comes from atoms, the atoms come from the explosion of the big
bang, but what comes before the Big Bang?) (Copleston, 1960). Berkeley
eliminated material substance from this chain of events and claimed that
sense-data come directly from God who was the gaurantor of the
orderliness of the universe (i.e., of the orderliness of sense-data).
3 . The Radical Skepticism of Hume
Hume was committed to the central ideas of empiricism that the
mind is a tabula rasa, that there were no innate ideas, and that all
knowledge is derived from sense data. However, he believed that Locke
and Berkeley were not consistent in applying these ideas (Jones, 1969b)
.
Hume believed that there are two kinds of sentences; sentences which
express relations of ideas (analytic propositions) or they express
matters of fact (synthetic propositions) . Analytic propositions have
the following characteristics: (1) Their negation leads to a self-
contradiction; (2) They are a priori; (3) They are true by definition;
and (4) They are necessarily true (Jones, 1969b; Copleston,
1960) .
To illustrate this point, consider the following
sentence: "All
triangles have three angles." To claim that "not all
triangles have
three angles," one says something that is both
false and self-
contradictory because any figure that does not have
three angles is not
13
3 triangle
. The sentence is a priori. One does not discover its truth
by looking anywhere or counting angles. The truth is simply understood
by contemplating its meaning. The sentence is true by definition. That
is, given the definition of a triangle as "a three-sided closed figure,"
it follows that a triangle must have three, and only three, angles. The
sentence is necessarily true. It cannot be false given the current
conventions of the English language.
It may seem that Hume is a rationalist in the same vein as
Descartes. However, Hume adds the final characteristic of analytic
propositions that they are all tautologies. That is, they are redundant
and repetitious. For example, the predicate ("has three angles") merely
repeats what was already in the subject ("a triangle").
For Hume, even though there is a priori knowledge, it is never
about anything but itself. A priori truths can never tell us about
reality, so the rationalistic position of a deductive system of
knowledge made up of purely a priori truths is not possible. Analytic
truths are nothing more than definitions, parts of definitions, and only
show how ideas can be related to each other: "A = A," "2 + 2 = 4,"
"sisters are girls."
Synthetic propositions are the opposite of analytic propositions.
They are necessarily derived from sense-data (Locke's "secondary
qualities" and "Berkeley's ideas"). To discern whether a sentence
like
"Cindy has a white dog" is meaningful, one must determine
whether the
main idea can be traced back to simple perceptions. Of
course, this
step which is easily done, is considered by Hume to
be a synthetic
proposition. For Hume, analytic and synthetic
propositions are the only
possible kinds of meaning in a truly empiricist
program. Any sentence
14
that is neither analytic (not a tautology) nor synthetic (its ideas
cannot be traced to sense perceptions) is nonsense (Jones, 1969b;
Copleston, 1960 )
.
Hume's view is a form of radical skepticism because he does not
have a need for God in his epistemology. Berkeley's notion of God is
attacked when the sentence, "God exists," is negated ("God does not
exist") and does not produce a self-contradiction. Because there is no
self-contradiction, this sentence is not an analytic proposition.
Furthermore, the idea of God cannot be traced back to sense-data
(Berkeley's position), therefore this is not a synthetic proposition
either. For Hume, the idea of God is literally nonsense.
This view of empiricism runs into a problem when one asks, "how is
the orderliness of the world explained without a notion of God?" Hume
had to admit that on purely empirical grounds it is difficult to answer
that question. Hume assumed that it is not God but universal causality
that holds things together, and there is no sense-datum to which we can
trace the idea of a cause. That is, no perceptual difference exists
between causality and seriality. The sentence, "X causes Y, and First
X happens, then Y happens," are confirmed by exactly the same sense-
data, yet they seem to have very different meanings. If there is no
such thing as "causality," then there are no necessary connections
between any two things in the universe. This is precisely what Hume
deduced from his radical empiricism (Jones, 1969b; Copleston, 1960).
Descartes maintained that he had an absolutely certain idea of
the
self. This view was ignored by both Locke and Berkeley,
but Hume was
skeptical of that idea as he was of innate knowledge,
God, and
causality. In the of Human Nature (1735,
1990) he wrote:
15
There are some philosophers who imagine we are every moment
intimately conscious of what we call our self; that is we feel its
existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain,
beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect
identity and simplicity ... For my part, when I enter most
intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble in some
particular perception of other, of heat or cold, light or shade,
love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any
time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the
perception ... But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I
may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind that they are nothing
but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed
each other with an inconceivable rapidity and are in a perceptual
flux and movement. Our eyes cannot turn in their sockets without
varying our perceptions. Our thought is still more variable than
our sight; and all our other senses and faculties contribute to
this change; nor is there any single power of the soul which
remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment (Bk. 1, chap.
4 , sec . 6 ) .
Hume's radical empiricism could not find justification for the
ideas of God, causality, or the self. His skepticism ran so deep that
certainly innate knowledge and perhaps any knowledge seemed untenable.
4 . Kant 1 s Reply to Hume
In the Or i t i one of Pure Reason (1781), Kant replied to Hume's
skepticism and also offered a certain compromise between the empiricists
and the rationalists. Kant rejected the idea of the tabula rasa .because
the mind was not a passive receptacle of neutral sense-data. Kant also
rejected the rationalist's concept that infants are born with innate
ideas (Copleston, 1960; Jones, 1969b)
a. Kant's Theory of Knowledge
To save epistemology (perhaps all of philosophy) from the
radio
empiricism of Hume, Kant had to invent a new conception
of knowledge.
Kant agreed with Hume that knowledge does indeed
have as its source the
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Humean notion of impressions whereby the mind passively receives sense-
data and copies it as images in thought. However, Kant continued, and
described another element in our knowledge not derived from sensory
experience nor from an independent reality. This element comes from the
mind itself.
According to Kant, the mind at birth is not a blank tablet as the
empiricists stressed. It is endowed with its own pure concepts which
serve to organize the incoming flux of sensory impressions into
substances, qualities, and quantities, and into causes and effects. For
Kant, the mind is furnished with twelve pure concepts or categories
(Table 2.1).
Table 2.1. Kant ' s Pure Concepts of Understanding
QUANTITY QUALITY RELATION MODALITY
unity affirmation substance-accidents possibility
plurality negation cause-effect actuality
totality limitation causal reciprocity necessity
Secondly, the mind is not passive as the empiricists claimed. The
mind does not merely receive sense-data, as a television screen does, a
stream of sense impressions. The mind actively interprets the world
rather than passively receiving and recording in memory what comes
to or
from the external world through the senses. The categories
of the mind
organize the sensory flux and give it meaning as substances,
with
qualities, and quantities, or related as causes and
effects, or in
reciprocal causation (Jones, 1969c; Copleston, 1960).
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These concepts of the understanding are considered by Kant to be
3
—
priori . He means by this that they are (1) logically prior to
experience; they are presupposed by all experience and (2) that they are
independent of experience; experience can never change them. They give
us the experience and knowledge that we have because they are the only
ways we can understand anything. Furthermore, the pure concepts of the
mind are (3) universal; they form the structure of any mind or any
consciousness. A further aspect of these concepts is (4) they are
necessary (i.e., a necessary condition of experience); without them
there is no knowledge, one cannot even have any experience (Jones,
1969c; Copleston, 1960).
For Kant, these concepts furnish the necessary element for
knowledge that Hume neglected to take into consideration. It is the
mind which supplies the necessary concepts which organize and unify the
flux of sensation. The world we know is a world created by the mind.
Without the a priori concept of substance to organize the flux of sense
impressions, one could not experience anything. Without the a
—
prior i,
concept of cause, which organizes sense impressions into causes and
effects, one could never experience causality. Rather, one would only
experience a particular sequence of atomistic sense impressions.
Hume's theory of knowledge is wrong, according to Kant, because it
does not account for the fact that we do experience things causally,
and
we do have scientific knowledge of things and events. Kant
believed
that Hume's theory fails because Hume holds that all
knowledge consists
merely of sense impressions. Hume's theory lacked
mechanisms which
structure the empirical data of the senses (i.e., the
a prior i
concepts) .
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It should also be pointed out that Kant's pure concepts of the
understanding are not the same as, and should not be confused with
Descartes
' innate ideas
. Descartes held that the innate ideas
correspond to an independent reality and that the mind is endowed with
these ideas by God so that we can know the true nature of reality. Kant
does not make this claim. The pure concepts of the understanding are
only forms of our consciousness and do not correspond to any sort of
independent reality. They are merely the underpinning of the way we
understand things. They do not tell us anything about what things are
like in themselves independently of our understanding them by our
concepts. The concepts are not structures of reality, instead they are
the structures of our minds (i.e., what our minds can know). They are
significant only epistemologically and more specifically they are
significant only as foundations of knowledge.
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CHAPTER III
SCIENTIFIC THEORIES OF PERCEPTION
A. The Helmholtz View of Perception
Following the philosophical foundation of perception and knowledge
by Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant, one of the first great
scientific theories of vision was proposed by Helmholtz in his Handbook
of Physiological Ootics published in 1866. Helmholtz argued in Volume
3, section 26 of his Ootics that it is not parsimonious to posit innate
mechanisms of perception when:
It is not clear how the assumption of these original 'space
sensations' can help the explanation of our visual perceptions,
when the adherents of this theory ultimately have to assume in by
far the great majority of cases that these sensations must be
overruled by the better understanding which we get by experience.
In that case, it would seem to me much easier and simpler to
grasp, that all apperception's of space were obtained simply by
experience (p.18).
Helmholtz held that perceptions are both hypotheses and
conclusions of unconscious inductive inferences. Introducing this idea,
he compared visual perception with language and how we learn language.
Helmholtz declared that as with meanings of words, "the concept of the
normal meaning of frequently repeated perceptions can come about with
immutable certainty, lightening speed and without the slightest
meditation" (p. 28)
.
Helmholtz stressed that forming associations of word with
meaning
and of sensation with meaning in perception results
from regular
experiences of the connection with no or few exceptions.
Meanings
accrue inductively from many instances to a conclusion
that is not
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logically necessary. For both language and perceptions, these
associations are formed by interaction with objects. For example, the
patterns of the grain of wood become associated with a hard substance
which can be dropped without breaking, and the transparency of glass
becomes associated with potentially dangerous brittleness. As a result
of these synthesized perceptions, one behaves differently with wooden as
opposed to glass objects.
Helmholtz suggested that we form our ideas of the physical form of
objects inductively, by combining visual experiences from many different
viewpoints, following the rules of perspective. Comparing these
inductive conclusions with the scientific method, Helmholtz stated,
"Inductive conclusions are never so reliable as well-tested conclusions
of conscious thought ... False inductions in the interpretation of our
perceptions we tend to label as illusions ... these unconscious
conclusions derived from sensations are equivalent ... to conclusions from
analogy." He emphasized the active structuring of perception which is
especially evident in conditions of dim illumination, or when complex
crystals or other structures are viewed , stereoscopically
:
a visual impression may be misunderstood at first, by not knowing
how to attribute the correct depth-dimensions; as when a distant
light, for example, is taken to be near one, or vice-versa.
Suddenly, it dawns on us what it is, and immediately, under the
influence of the correct comprehension, the correct perceptual
image also is developed in its full intensity. . .Similar
experiences have happened to everybody, proving that the elements
in sense perceptions that are derived from experience are just as
powerful as those that are derived from present sensations (p.
21 ) .
Perception does not arise from the passive acceptance of
stimulus
patterns, but rather from internally organized knowledge
of objects and
processes. In other words, stored representations
are utilized m a
top-down fashion for interpreting or reading sensory
signals, as
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originating from particular objects. Similarly, we project our meanings
of words on what we describe. The idea that processes search for the
best interpretation of available evidence is similar to present theories
of perception which involve active computational processes by the brain.
B. Marr's Theory of Percent ion
Exciting developments have occurred during the 20th century.
Neuroscientists have developed a sophisticated understanding of the
neural systems which underlie perception. Engineers and computer
scientists have developed the computer models of artificial
intelligence. Psychology has a new subfield called cognitive science.
With these developments, new and exciting theories of perception began
to emerge which posited few neurologically plausible constraints and
allowed for the development of data-driven theories of perception. A
particularly remarkable theory of vision is Marr's description of the
relationship between anatomical/physiological observations and
perceptual functioning (Marr, 1982; Bruce and Green, 1987). Marr's
approach to understanding visual perception is described in the
following passage:
Almost never can a complex system of any kind be understood as a
simple extrapolation from the properties of its elementary
components. Consider for example, some gas in a bottle. A
description of thermodynamic effects - temperature, pressure,
density, and the relationships among these factors
- is not
formulated by using a large set of equations, one for each of the
particles involved. Such effects are described at their own
level that of the enormous collection of particles; the e
or is
to show that in principle the microscopic and the
macroscopic
descriptions are consistent with one another (p. 19, 198
Marr's data-driven
Gibsonian view (see next
theory of perception differed from the
chapter) in that perception is direct and all
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information necessary for perception is contained in the environment
itself. Marr believed that a theory of visual perception should account
for neural processing and to predict outcomes of empirical studies.
Marr proposed three levels of explanation: computational theory,
algorithm, and implementation. First, there is a formation of the raw
primal sketch defined as a representation of the light intensity changes
in a stimulus. Next, a 2 1/2-D sketch is formed which is a
representation of the depths and orientations of the visible surfaces of
an object. Finally, top-down processing is used to form a 3-D
representation of the object.
Visual processes are designed to sort out factors of geometry,
reflectance of a surface, illumination of a scene, and determination of
viewpoint. The multi-phased procedure of forming the primal sketch
involves steps such as detecting intensity changes, representing and
analyzing local geometrical structure, and detecting illuminating
effects (i.e., light sources, highlights, and transparencies). The
steps reveal changes in illumination that occur in a scene at the point
where the edges and changes in surface contour are likely to occur.
This phase ends with a representation that makes explicit the size and
disposition of intensity changes, enabling one to detect the boundaries
in an image and their source. The raw primal sketch consists of a set
of blobs oriented in various directions. This is similar to the role of
Hubei and Wiesel 1 s feature detectors which can discern contrasts and
general orientation. These reductions and simplifications are
mental
representations or symbolic depictions of the "raw information"
transmitted by the light. According to Marr, perception
consists of a
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series of such simplified sketches en route to a more veridical view of
the world.
Following the formation of the primal sketch, other processes
operate upon it to derive a representation of the geometry of the
visible surfaces. These processes include stereopsis, the use of cues
of shading, texture, occluding contours, and various aspects of motion.
In global stereopsis, the perceive develops an internal representation
that includes information on depth, surface orientation, and surface
discontinuities. Like the primal sketch, the 2 1/2-D sketch is
constructed in a viewer-centered coordinate frame. It depends on a
single vantage point and therefore cannot explain one of the most
important facts about visual perception - the perceived constancy of the
shape of an object despite movements by the viewer.
Marr claimed that the goal of early visual processing is to
construct a 2 1/2-D sketch. This process avoids the problems of
traditional psychological analysis associated with intuitive
distinctions like figure, ground, region, and object. The various
modules of early visual processing and the 2 1/2-D sketch itself explain
only the discovery of the surface properties of an image. These steps
occur in the same way, whether one is viewing people, animals, trees, or
paintings. Only shapes and reflections need to be made clear to the
viewer at this point. As Marr claimed, the 2 1/2-D sketch is the final
step before a surface is interpreted (as being a particular
object or
sets of objects); in fact, it may well mark the end of purely perceptual
processes
.
The final step of early visual processing involves
the
transformation of shapes from a pure representation
that is matched to
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the processes of perception into a representation that is suitable for
recognition. The next task is object recognition which requires a
stable shape description that does not depend on a particular momentary
viewpoint. Thus, the pieces of a shape must be described in terms of a
frame of reference based on the shape itself. A scheme for representing
shapes involves the use of a coordinate system and component axes
identified from an image that captures what is specific about the
objects in question.
What does this mean in practice? The object is broken down into
components and subcomponents until all of its parts have been uniquely
specified. The model's coordinate system and component axes are
identified from an image, and the arrangement of the component axes in
that coordinate system is specified. The products of a primal sketch
resemble line segments oriented in various directions. For example, the
products of the 3-D sketch resemble stick figures composed of pipe
cleaners. The brain automatically transposes the contours it has
derived from the 2 1/2-D sketch onto axes of symmetry that resemble
stick figures. By the time the 3-D sketch has been constructed, the
final result should be a unique description of any object one can
distinguish. The same object should always yield the same unique
description regardless of the angle of viewing, and different
representations should reflect the similarity between different objects,
while also preserving whatever differences may matter.
There are a series of steps through which presumably both
humans
and machines must pass in making sense of a scene or an
image. The
first is computational; the formation of the primal
sketch consists of
description o£ a scene in terms of a vast collection of
features like
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edges, lines, blobs which are the kinds of feature that may depend upon
neural detectors described by Hubei and Wiesel. This primary sketch, an
initial symbolic representation of the image, is formed by processing
mechanisms that are completely independent of any high level knowledge
about objects. The second stage involves analysis of the primal sketch
by symbolic processes that are capable of grouping lines, points, and
blobs together in various ways. That is, one can see a round triangular
blob before knowing that it is a chestnut tree. Correlatively
,
individuals with certain varieties of brain damage may be able to see
shapes quite reliably without knowing what the objects represent
(Weizkrantz, 1986). In the final stages, an actual identification of an
object along with its component parts is made, and this identification
should uniquely determine which object is perceived. Top-down knowledge
about the nature and construction of the objects of the world presumably
is applied in this last phase of early visual processing. According to
this scheme, the sorts of knowledge about the world which earlier had
been believed essential for perception actually arise only after shapes
have been completely analyzed.
Marr 1 s theory of vision is a data-driven theory of perception.
This theory takes into account various levels of processing, and it
requires few constraints and no innate knowledge to produce visual
perception. Marr ' s system requires little top-down knowledge for
perception
.
Marr was not a developmental psychologist and in Vision
(1982), he
did not describe what cognitive abilities the infant
is endowed with at
birth to develop the 3-D sketch nor how the neonate
ever develops a 3-D
sketch without innate knowledge. Marr ' s theory
is important for
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developmental psychologists because it provides a framework for dividing
and studying the development of what is anatomical/physiological and
what is cognitive and the interactions between these two domains.
A complete model of infant perception must account for whether
the infant is endowed with knowledge at birth, or if there is no innate
knowledge, how such knowledge emerges. In the following section,
developmental psychology's attempts to understand the emergence of
perception and knowledge during infancy will be discussed.
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CHAPTER IV
PIAGET'S THEORY OF OBJECT PERMANENCE
Since Piaget first published his books on the nature of cognitive
development in infants and children, it has been widely believed that
the development of object permanence is one of the central milestones of
early cognitive development and serves to underlie the development of
later cognition (e.g., Gruber and Voneche, 1975). For Piaget, the
object concept has three implicit, common-sense beliefs that people
share about the basic nature of objects and themselves (Piaget, 1954,
chap 1, pp. 3-4). First, the adult believes that all objects coexist as
physically distinct and independent entities within a common space.
Second, the existence of other objects, whether animate or inanimate is
independent of one's interaction or non-interaction with these other
objects. For example, when an object disappears from view, there is no
automatic assumption that the object has lost its existence. When one
stops seeing, hearing, or touching an object, this action is not
confused with the physical existence of the object and thus, it is not
believed that it has been annihilated once one loses sensory contact
with it. For those with the Piagetian notion of object permanence, "out
of sight" might mean "out of mind" but not "out of existence."
Finally, just as an object's existence is independent of one's
physical contact, it is also independent of one's psychological
contact
with it. One knows that once gone from sight, an object could move
or
be moved from one location to another. It may or may
not continue to
exist in the place where it was last seen; one may
or may not have to
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look for it in a new location. In summary, according to Piaget, the
object concept is a notion which holds that other objects and oneself
are equally real and objective, and the existence and behavior of other
objects are fundamentally independent of one's perceptual and motor
contact with them.
Piaget made several important claims about the development of the
object concept (1954, chap 1). First, Piaget claimed that this
conception of objects is not innate, but rather, acquired through
experience (p. 4). Second, the acquisition is a gradual process that
develops over the entire span of infancy, i.e., the entire sensorimotor
period from birth through 18-months (chap 1) . This process consists of
a universal, fixed sequence of six developmental substages with the
infant acquiring different aspects of the full concept at each stage
( chap 1 )
.
In the first stage, from birth to one-month, infants look at
objects within their visual field (pp. 4-13). However, they do not
follow with their eyes an object that moves away. The infants show no
behavior that could be interpreted as a visual or manual search for the
vanished object. There is no evidence to suggest that the infant has
any mental representation of the object's oncoming existence, once
visual contact with it is lost
.
During the second stage, between 1- and 4-months, infants prolong
their looks at the place where an object was before it disappeared; and
they do not actively attempt to find where it went. For
example, if
they are playing with a toy and drop it, they may continue
looking at
their hand rather than looking for the toy on the floor (pp.
4-13).
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During Stage 3 (48 months), the infant shows some progress in
differentiating objects as independent entities from the self's action
towards objects (pp. 13-44). The infant begins to anticipate the future
positions by extrapolating from the present direction of movement. If
an object falls from the crib to the floor, the infant may lean over to
look for it rather than simply stare motionlessly at the spot where it
was before it disappeared.
In Stage 4 (8-12 months) of the development of object permanence,
infants begin to manually search for and retrieve an object that they
see someone hide under a cloth or other cover (pp. 44-66). However,
they make a peculiar mistake under some circumstances during this stage
known as the A-not-B error. If they see an object hidden twice in
succession under the same container, they retrieve the object from there
each time. If they then see the same object hidden under a different
container, however, they look under the original container where they
found it before. It is as if the original container has assumed an
independent status as a hiding place.
In Stage 5 (12-18 months), infants stop making the A-not-B error
and search wherever they last saw the object hidden (pp. 66-86)
.
However, they have difficulty with invisible displacements. If an
object is placed under one pillow and then is moved in sight of the
infant and placed under another, the infant will look for the object m
the new hiding place. However, infants will not look in the new
location unless they saw the object moved. By 18-24 months (Stage 6),
infants understand this type of complex displacement and they
immediately search in the correct place whether or not they saw
the
movement of the object (PP- 86-96)
.
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Since Piaget published his original account of object concept
development, much follow-up research has been done (see Gratch, 1975;
Harris, 1983; Wellman, Cross, & Bartsch, 1987 for reviews)
. Much of the
early research confirmed that young infants fail to search for hidden
objects, thus supporting Piagetian theory. Several groups of
investigators examining large samples and utilizing longitudinal and
cross-sectional research paradigms have found the same behavioral
patterns that Piaget described, and furthermore, observed them occurring
in the same age sequence (e.g., Uzgiris and Hunt, 1975). Until the past
decade or so, most theorists accepted Piaget's assertion that the infant
was not born with the object concept and must acquire it during the
course of infancy.
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CHAPTER V
GIBSON'S THEORY OF PERCEPTION
The work of J.J. Gibson and especially the work of E.J. Gibson has
had an important influence on the theorizing of infant perceptual
development (J.J. Gibson, 1950, 1966; E.J. Gibson, 1988; Gibson &
Spelke, 1983; Gibson, 1995). Like Piaget, the Gibsons elaborated a
theoretical formulation in their writings and raised important
epistemological points. In the later part of her career, E.J. Gibson
has focused her research on the development of infant perception
according to the theoretical tenants of their larger theory of
perception.
Traditional views of perception have focused on finding a
correlation between a particular stimulus and what a person consciously
perceives. Perceiving different colors is simply a function of the
experimenter's manipulating different wavelengths of light. Perceiving
changes in musical tones is simply the Result of detecting changes in
the frequency of air vibrations. This traditional psychophysical view
describes the relationship between changes in stimuli and perception.
Gibson's ecological theory of perception had a different approach.
J.J. Gibson focused his efforts not on a given wavelength of light
but instead concentrated on the variation of light in the ambient
array.
Gibson believed that the environment was organized in such a
way that
the perceiver was able to take in this information and
perceive certain
spatial properties. For example, texture gradients
are an intrinsic,
natural part of the landscape, and because the
perceptual system is able
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to take in information about texture gradients, the observer can
perceive depth. Another example is visual proprioception, whereby the
movement of the observer's body and the movement of other objects allows
for a change in the ambient array and provides for perceptual
information beyond just the static layout of the environment. These
examples give rise to the radical idea, apart from traditional
empiricists, nativists, and information-processing psychologists, that
perceptual and structural information about the environment exists
separately from what goes on in the mind. Also, perception is not a
result of synthesizing contiguously occurring events, nor is it some
sort of computation performed by the brain.
According to Gibson, the ambient array provides much structural
information and as a result of this organization, it seems reasonable to
grant the infant basic perceptual processes which allow it to detect
information about the world. The infant is simply a perceptual being,
and there is no need to grant the infant any conceptual knowledge or
abilities to process physical phenomena. Neonates can not only detect
cues for depth or motion but also perceive depth and motion directly
because the information is contained in the environment and is not the
result of some sort of a computational activity in the infant s head.
Such a view of perception contrasts with both traditional empiricists
views of perception and Piaget's view of constructing concepts to
perceive the world by assimilating and accommodating perceptual input.
In An Essav Towards a New Theory of Vision (1990, 1709), Berkelev
argued that depth perception is learned by a process of
association.
Specifically, the muscle strain caused by the convergence of
the eyes
and also the associations of moving towards and touching
objects serve
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as the cues for depth. Berkeley's account holds that tactual sensations
inform the person about depth directly; visual sensations are simply
cues of the more directly informative tactual sensations. In contrast,
Gibson argued that there is nothing special about tactual information.
Tactual information can provide direct information about depth, but as
Gibson pointed out, so can visual cues such as binocular convergence and
texture gradients.
The development of object permanence serves as a focal point to
contrast the theories of Piaget and Gibson. According to Piagetian
theory, the newborn has no conception that objects continue to exist
when the infant's view of the object is obstructed. During the course
of infancy, the infant learns that grabbing objects, scanning the
environment and moving its head can lead to perceptual contact with an
object that has disappeared. Piaget believed that the infant
hypothesizes that although objects no longer continue to exist after
they disappear, they can be brought back into existence by such actions.
As infants develop, they realize that this primitive hypothesis fails
when they are able to overcome the A-not-B error. In other words, when
infants are able to overcome the tendency to perseverate reaching to the
place where the object was last seen, the realization occurs that the
object has a separate, continued existence apart from the infants
sensorimotor scheme. Piaget held that because there are so many search
errors, the infant slowly develops accurate searching and because
there
are so few perceptual cues for the continued existence of the
occluded
object, the infant must be constructing the idea that objects continue
to exist apart from infants' direct perception of the
object.
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Gibson did not believe that infants have to construct knowledge of
reality (or object permanence) the way Piaget described. Instead,
infants must learn to distinguish between different perceptual
transformations in order to perceive whether or not an object continues
to exist. For example, consider the different transformations of an
object fading into the background or of an object that is gradually
occluded. Although there are no cues specifying the objects' continued
existence while it is occluded, there was important perceptual
information which existed before the object's disappearance. For
example, when the object is gradually occluded, the infant is able to
perceive accretion/deletion information. The problem for the infant is
not to construct the reality of the existence of objects, but according
to Gibson, it is "...to learn to distinguish between these two kinds of
optical transformation in order to perceive when a thing merely goes out
of sight and when it vanishes, but he (the infant) does not have to
construct reality out of impermanent sensations." (1966, p. 285).
In Piagetian theory, experience and learning determine what
infants can perceive. With each stage of development, the child
acquires a radically different view of the world. In contrast, Gibson
argues that because the neonate is able to pick up information from the
ambient array, one would not expect the child to arrive at radical new
interpretations of the world. Instead, the infant's perceptual system
becomes increasingly refined and resonates more clearly to the available
information in the environment. This process of refinement opeia^et
two ways. When presented with a set of objects from the same class, an
infant is better able to detect features and components
that separate it
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from objects of other classes. Over time, the infant learns to
distinguish between features and components within a given class.
A second learning process is the detection of invariants in the
environment. An infant learns to perceive that an object will have
certain properties which will remain invariant even after other
properties of the object have been transformed. For example, the basic
features of a face will remain the same even though a face can change
from frowning to smiling. Furthermore, a second type of invariant can
be perceived, whereby a class of objects will have certain invariant
features shared by individual members, while other features may be
different. For example, the relative position of the eyes, nose, and
mouth are invariant across faces, but the length of noses, thickness of
lips, and shapes of eyes will vary from individual to individual within
the class of faces.
In a final departure from traditional empiricists' accounts of
perceptual and cognitive development which hold that infants becomes
less dominated by the immediate perceptual world and more governed by a
represented world of remembered and anticipated events, the Gibsons'
theory de-emphasizes representations. E.J. Gibson asked:
What is wrong with saying that the child is stimulus bound, and
that cognitive development is a liberation from these bonds by the
operations of intelligence? This is Piaget's opinion. One must
admit its popularity and persuasiveness, for a neonate's attention
does seem to be captured by a few kinds of events in its
environment. But the developmental change is not one of doing
without stimulus information, it is one of seeking stimulus
information in a directed, systematic fashion. (1969, p. 448).
Such a view of representations seems quite reasonable if one
can
accept that the environment contains all the information
that the
organism needs to perceive spatial, location, depth, and
continuation ot
objects without a sophisticated cognitive apparatus. This view
suggests
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that during the course of infancy, the infant becomes increasingly
sophisticated at perceiving the invariants and affordances (the
possibility afforded to the perceive for action by an object) offered by
the environment. There is no indication that the Gibsons deny the
emergence or the existence of cognitive activity during infancy, rather
they simply point out that it is unnecessary for the infant to rely on
cognition to gather information and perceive the world.
The Gibsonian theory of perception is important in terms of its
theoretical contributions to- understanding perception and to the vast
number of empirical investigations into perception of reading, piloting
airplanes, infant development and so forth. However, it is a view held
to be orthogonal to mainstream theories of perception (e.g., Gregory,
1977; Marr 1982). Cognitive psychologists have chided the Gibsons and
their followers for their simple belief that the world can be perceived
directly without recourse to intermediate computational processes such
as Marr described. In developmental psychology, this position is likely
due to the current dominance of information-processing theories and the
reaction of information-processing theorists to the claims made by
Piaget regarding object permanence. The contemporary information-
processing literature examining the emergence of the infant's conception
of the permanence of objects will be discussed.
37
CHAPTER VI
CONTEMPORARY VIEWS OF OBJECT PERMANENCE
A_s Baillarqeon
' s Studies of Object Permanence
Baillargeon and her colleagues (Baillargeon, Spelke, and
Wasserman, 1985; Baillargeon, 1987; Baillargeon, 1993; 1995) embarked on
a series of interesting studies designed to investigate young infants'
capacity for object permanence while avoiding the motoric and other
methodological problems posed by Piaget's research. These studies
relied on a paradigm that did not require infants to use manual search
as an index for demonstrating object permanence.
The paradigm developed by Baillargeon et al. focused on infants'
ability to understand that one solid object cannot move through the
space occupied by another object. They reasoned that if infants are
surprised when an object moves through the space occupied by another
object, then infants must have some sort of object permanence because
they take into account the existence of the occluded object.
In a series of experiments, infants aged 5 1/2-months (Baillargeon
et al, 1985), 4 1/2-months, and 3 1/2- months (Baillargeon, 1987) were
habituated to a screen that rotated back and forth through a 180° arc.
After the infants were habituated, a box was placed behind the screen,
and the infants saw possible and impossible test events. In the
possible event, the screen stopped when it reached the occluded box;
in
the impossible event, the screen rotated through a full
180° arc as
though the box were not there. Both 5 1/2- and 4 1 / 2
-month-old infants
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looked significantly longer at the impossible test event relative to the
possible one. In further studies, Baillargeon (1987) found that some
infants as young as 3.5-months would look longer at the impossible event
relative to the possible event. Specifically, she found that infants
who were fast habituators (i.e., infants who took only 6 or 7 trials to
reach the habituation criterion on an inf ant -control procedure) looked
statistically longer at the impossible trials than at the possible
trials
.
Habituation Event
Test Events
Possible Event
Impossible Event
Fig. 6.1. Schematic drawing of the event
3aillargeon et al. (1985) and Baillargeon
Baillargeon, 1994)
.
shown to the infants in
( 1987 ) (Figure adapted from
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According to Baillargeon, the results of these studies revealed
certain cognitive capabilities of infants that occur much earlier than
Piaget had theorized: "the possible event is consistent with the
expectation or belief examined in the experiment; the impossible event,
in contrast, violates this expectation. That is, if the infants possess
the belief being tested, they will perceive the impossible event as more
novel or surprising than the possible event, and will therefore look
reliably longer at the impossible than at the possible event"
(Baillargeon, 1994, p. 133). Baillargeon and colleagues concluded that
the infants represented the existence of the box behind the screen,
understood that the screen could not rotate through the space occupied
by the box, expected the screen to stop in its path when it reached the
point of where contact should have been made with the box, and were
surprised when it did not stop.
Furthermore, the results cannot be explained in terms of the
infants preferring to look at the 180° rotation more than the 120°
rotation. To demonstrate this point, Baillargeon et al., (1985) ran a
control group of infants who were habituated to the same 180° rotation
as the experimental subjects. During the test trials, however, the
control group infants saw both the 180° rotation and the 120 rotation
with the blocks at the side of the paddle. The analyses revealed that
there was no main effect for looking longer at one rotation compared to
the other. A similar control group was carried out in Baillargeon
(1987), except that the blocks were kept away from view to prevent
infants from looking at the blocks equally in the two conditions
which
could have accounted for no difference in looking times at
the two
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rotations
.
Even with this procedure, the infants looked equally at the
different paddle rotations.
The results of the moving paddle studies cannot be explained by
the hypothesis that when infants are seeing the impossible event, they
are simply perceiving a novel test event vis-a-vis the habituation
event. The 180° impossible test event is perceptually a familiar event,
and the 120° possible event is actually the more novel of the two
events; yet on average, the infants looked longer at the impossible
event. Thus, the infants had to overcome a perceptually novel effect to
prefer the impossible event. Baillargeon believed that what is guiding
the infants' looking behavior is some sort of cognitively-mediated
behavior and not a perceptually-mediated behavior. However, with this
interpretation, it is assumed that infants always prefer to look at a
novel event. As discussed later, there are exceptions to this rule, and
given certain constraints, this assumption is not always valid.
B. Theoretical Interpretations of Baillargeon ' s Data
With these results and results from other labs examining infants'
understanding of physical phenomena (e.g., Spelke, 1988a), new theories
of infant cognitive development began to emerge. One of the most
notable theories is that of Spelke (1988a; 1988b; Spelke et al., 1992).
Spelke finds her philosophical roots in the rationalism of Descartes,
Kant, and Chomsky and holds that there are innate properties of the
mind
which structure experience. In contrast to the constructivist
theory of
Piaget, Spelke believes that cognition develops from its
own foundations
rather than a foundation of perception and action. The
initial
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capacities of the mind give rise to conceptions that are appropriate to
the experience of children and adults (e.g., objects move only on
connected paths)
. Also in contrast to Piaget, initial conceptions of
the mind form the core of later conceptions. During infancy and
childhood, these core conceptions are enriched and refined as knowledge
develops, but they are rarely overturned. Piaget, in contrast, believed
that movement from one period to another marked a mini-Copernican
revolution in that thinking in a new period is a qualitatively different
way of thinking about the world.
Spelke's theory centers on two general claims about cognition in
infancy (Spelke et al., 1992). The Active Representation Thesis holds
that infants can represent states of the world that they no longer
perceive. By operating on these representations, infants come to know
about states of the world that they no longer perceived. The Core
Representation Thesis holds that young infants' reasoning about physical
phenomena is in accord with principles that are at the heart of mature,
common sense conceptions of physical phenomena. According to Spelke,
examples of mature common sense conceptions are continuity (objects move
only on connected paths; they do not jump from one place to another) and
solidity (objects move only on unobstructed paths; no parts of two
distinct objects coincide in times and space) . However, infants
reasoning may not be in accord with principles that are absent from or
peripheral to mature conceptions. Examples of such peripheral
conceptions are gravity (objects move downward in the absence of
support) and inertia (objects do not change their motion abruptly and
spontaneously). Spelke calls these later two conceptions peripheral
because adults do not seem to have, nor require for adaptive
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functioning, full scientific knowledge of these forces. For example,
many adults believe that unsupported objects will fall at a constant
speed or that an object which moves freely after moving in a circle will
continue in a curvilinear motion (McCloskey, Caramazza, & Green, 1983).
Spelke believes that knowledge of continuity and solidity are at
the core of knowledge because they rely on general principles that apply
widely to perhaps all events involving material bodies. However,
gravity and inertia rely on reasoning that may depend on a larger number
of principles with relatively narrow applications. Furthermore, core
knowledge is innate but scientific knowledge has to develop.
According to Spelke, Baillargeon
' s moving paddle studies provide
some experimental support for the active representation thesis. Spelke
et al. (1992) write: "Young infants can represent an object that they
no longer perceive. Infants respond with heightened attention to an
impossible visible motion even when recognition of the impossibility of
the motion depends on representing the existence, location, and
properties of a hidden object" (p. 609)
.
Recently, Baillargeon (1994) argued that infants are born not with
intuitive notions about the nature of objects in the manner that Spelke
describes, but rather with brain mechanisms which constrain the manner
in which infants reason about physical phenomena. Furthermore,
Baillargeon criticized Spelke' s innate theory because infants perform
differently on different tasks which presumably should require the same
underlying principle. Thus, according to Baillargeon, infants more
easily learn a task which more closely resembles events that are
encountered in their daily environment. In other words, the
easier the
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task, the younger the age at which infants will be able to detect the
impossibility of the situation.
C- Criticisms, of Baillarqeon
' s View of Object Permanent
The data from the moving paddle studies are compelling and
Spelke's theory is at first glance convincing. However, there are
several serious problems with this line of research and theorizing,
which may undermine the entire approach. One problem is that most of
the studies used to support Spelke's innate theory hypothesis and
Baillargeon ' s expectancy theory are based on empirical studies which use
the habituation/dishabituation paradigm. Normally, this paradigm is
used to test infants' ability to discriminate visual stimuli. The
decline in attentivness over the familiarization trials is habituation.
During posthabituation trials novel and familiar stimuli are presented
to ensure that the lower level of attentiveness found on the later
familiarization trials is due to the familiarization stimulus.
Significantly greater attentiveness to the novel stimulus on the
posthabituation trials indicates that infants recognized the old
stimulus as familiar. The habituation /dishabituation paradigm has been
both utilized and examined extensively for the past 30 years (Bornstein,
1985; 1992; Cohen and Gelber, 1975) and habituation is a relatively
well understood phenomenon. However, do the underlying neurological
mechanisms which support habituation also support cognitive
functioning
on a conscious level? Are there other perceptual
explanations for
performance on violation-of -expectation paradigms that
are similar to
the moving paddle paradigm? Do infants even have
to come into the
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laboratory with prior knowledge of some phenomenon to show
distinguishing behavior between possible and impossible test events?
1 • Neurological Underpinnings of Habituation
Most models of infant habituation rely on some sort of memory
buffer, emerging representation developing during looks, and some sort
of comparator which pits the stimulus of the sensory input with an
emerging representation in long-term memory (Olson & Sherman, 1983).
When infants have been repeatedly exposed to an isolated presentation of
a visual stimulus, they exhibit changes in their behavior toward the
stimulus. Initial long visual fixation responses result in gradually
diminishing reaction as the stimulus is encountered repeatedly.
However, the fixation response often can be restored when a new and
different visual stimulus is introduced. Because changes in behavior as
a function of experience are generally accepted as evidence for learning
and memory processes (Bornstein, 1985; 1992), the waning and recovery of
the infant's visual fixations (habituation and novelty detection) have
\
been interpreted as indices of rudimentary cognitive processes (Cohen &
Gelber, 1975) . With this interpretation in mind, researchers have used
the infant visual fixation paradigm as a behavioral tool to study how
infants acquire and process information.
Most theories of infant visual fixation dynamics are derived from
Sokolov's (1963) model-stimulus comparator hypothesis, m which
organisms attempt to construct internal models of environmental
stimuli
Attention toward a stimulus wanes as the internal model more
and more
closely "matches" the environmental stimulus. This
type of theory
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highlights how stimulus encoding and memory control the infant's visual
fixation
.
Mandler (1988) has argued that Baillargeon
' s use of the
habituation procedure is one of the few cases in which there is
declarative processing (conscious knowledge of factual information)
because the infants had to remember that the block was behind the
paddle. To determine if habituation/dishabituation performance
indicates declarative processing, one may rely on neurological data from
primates, neurologically impaired adults, and intact adults to discover
what structures seem to mediate performance on habituation studies.
Furthermore, tasks which are normally thought of as requiring
declarative processes such as cross-modal and delayed non-matching to
sample tasks can be used to determine at what age and what underlying
structures might be involved with performance on such tasks.
In a comprehensive review of the neurological literature, Nelson
(1995) claimed that habituation/dishabituation performance does not take
place at a declarative level but rather at a procedural level (i.e., a
level that does not require conscious processing such as riding a bike)
;
and furthermore, behavioral tasks which indicate declarative processing
rely on different neurological structures than
habituation/dishabituation performance. Nelson described the robust
findings that novelty preferences are mediated by the hippocampus and
surrounding structures. For example, Bachevalier, Bnckson, and Hager
(1993) presented 5-, 15- , and 30-day-old infant monkeys and
adult
monkeys with pairs of identical stimuli for 30 s. The monkeys
were then
given a 10 s delay followed by two 5 s test trials.
The monkeys that
were older than 15 days showed strong novel
preferences. However,
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monkeys from which the amygdala and hippocampus were removed did not
show any preferences. Thus, the hippocampus and amygdala appear to be
important structures for supporting novelty preferences.
If the hippocampus plays an important role for memory and
functions early in infancy (for reviews see, Diamond, 1990), it is
important to consider whether hippocampal functioning is sufficient to
make a task declarative. According to Nelson, if habituation
performance were to reflect declarative processing, why do very young
infants who habituate and dishabituate fail on tasks that seem to
require declarative processing?
An example of a task which seems to rely on some declarative
processes is the cross-modal task whereby infants are given a stimulus
in one modality and given a familiar and novel stimulus in another
modality. For example, infants are given a stimulus to explore
haptically (without seeing the stimulus) and then are presented with
pictures of the familiarized stimulus and a novel stimulus. If the
infants look longer at the novel stimulus, then it is inferred that the
infant has recognized the familiar stimulus. This recognition is
achieved by encoding the stimulus haptically, transferring the
representation to another modality, maintaining this representation, and
discriminating between the familiar and novel visual presentation.
In general, it is not until 6-months or older when infants will
consistently prefer to look longer at the novel stimulus when
habituation was through haptic exposure (Rose and Ruff, 1987). This
finding suggests that a task which is more complicated than
a simple
unimodal recognition task may require more limbic system
development.
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Also, tasks which require more than mere recognition may be beyond the
capacity of younger infants who have less mature neural development.
Such further neural development might include the development of
the amygdala. Murray and Mishkin (1985) reported that bilateral lesions
of the amygdala impair the ability to make cross-modal associations.
This finding suggests that the involvement of both the amygdala and
hippocampus are necessary when cross-modal recognition is required. The
latter structure is for mediating novelty preferences and the former
structure is for drawing cross-modal associations.
Nelson (1994) proposed that the age of onset between the ability
to show novelty preferences during habituation studies and the ability
to demonstrate declarative forms of processing indicates that the memory
processes which utilize hippocampal functioning in early infancy differ
from those used in later infancy. In support of this view, researchers
have indicated that the novelty preferences of young infants might be
better characterized as reflexive (Nelson and Collins, 1991; Webster,
Ungerleider
,
Bachevalier, 1991) and differ from the novelty preferences
demonstrated in tasks which require explicit processing in later
infancy
.
Nelson and Collins (1991, 1992) observed the cortical ERPs of
infants to determine if the number of times a particular stimulus is
presented indicates whether the stimulus is novel or familiar. Infants
were presented with two faces equally often for 10 trials so that
infants could be equally familiarized to two events and then
tested with
three types of test events. On 60% of the test trials,
one of the faces
presented during familiarization was presented (the
frequent-familiar
event). On a random 20% of the trials, the other
familiarization face
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was presented (infrequent-familiar event). On each of the remaining
trials, a different face was presented. If the infants had fully
encoded both events during familiarization, then one might expect them
to respond equivalently to these same two faces presented during test
and to distinguish these faces from the novel ones.
The results indicated that at 4-months, infants did not
distinguish among the three types of events. At 6-months, they
responded both to how often the stimuli were presented and to whether
the stimuli had been seen before. Specifically, infants distinguished
between familiar stimuli presented frequently versus infrequently, and
the novel stimuli. At 8-months, the ERP data only distinguished between
novel and familiar events. At this age, event frequency did not seem to
play a role in the ERP response. Nelson and Collins suggested that
until 6- to 8-months, novel preferences are simply obligatory responses
to infrequently presented events. By 8-months however, infants are able
to ignore how frequently a stimulus is presented and to attend simply to
whether an event is novel or familiar. Again, at early ages, novelty
responses are reflexlike and memory inferred from novelty preferences,
despite being dependent on hippocampal or related structures, may differ
qualitatively from memory as evaluated in the habituation studies.
The results of Nelson's work provide some support to the
interpretation that infants' looking behavior during the test trials
is
guided by implicit (i.e., not requiring conscious processing)
perceptually mediated processes. This is a very different idea
than
Baillargeon ' s interpretation that the infants' looking was
guided by
expectations about physical phenomena. Nelson's review
indicated that
dishabituation performance is not necessarily an
explicit (i.e.,
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requiring conscious processing
) process and that the interpretation of
the data fit in well with other classifications of memory which place
habituation in a category of implicit or perceptual processing (e.g.
Schacter
,
1995 ) .
In interpreting the results of the moving paddle studies,
Baillargeon used phrases such as "understand that an object continues to
exist when occluded" (Baillargeon et al., p. 204, 1985); infants build
core representations during habituation and utilize this information for
"reasoning" during the test trials (Baillargeon, p. 309, 1993). Words
like "understand" and "reasoning" are words which imply a fairly high
level of cognitive processing, yet there are never any operational
definitions of these processes, nor any explanations of how they
develop. It may not be parsimonious to posit grand cognitive abilities
about infants' thinking when simpler perceptual explanations such as
those offered by Nelson might suffice.
2 . Developing Expectations in the Lab
How might a process work which does not require any prior
knowledge about a particular phenomenon on the part of the infants in a
testing situation? One such process might be that infants perceptually
learn about events quickly during training trials and when their
expectations are violated, they attend longer to the violating event.
There are several studies in the literature which show that
infants can
learn about a phenomenon, even an arbitrary one, very
quickly.
Testing whether infants can use a representation to guide
reaching
toward an object in the dark, Clifton, Rochat , Litovsky, and Perris
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(1991) presented infants with a large ring and a small ring, each of
which had different sounding objects attached. When presented with a
large ring, the infants reached with two hands to grasp it, and when
presented with a small object, the infants reached with one hand.
During test trials, the infants were presented with either a large or
small ring along with its corresponding sound in total darkness. During
the dark test trials (which were interspersed by light trials)
,
the
infants reached appropriately for either a large or small object based
on the sound they learned that corresponded to the object. Thus, the
infants could quickly learn a pairing between object size and
corresponding sound and use that representation to guide their reaching
toward the object during the dark trials.
A study by Goubet and Clifton (1996) examined the possibility of
6.5-month-olds to use a representation of a previously seen event to
guide their search behaviors. One group of infants watched a ball fall
through a vertical tube, roll down a left or right path, and land in a
tray that was to either left or right of the vertical tube. The ball
made a distinctive sound when it went to either the left or right path
but rolled silently to its final resting position. These infants were
presented with these trials in both the light and dark.
A control group was presented with an event in the light whereby
the ball came to rest in a tray at midline below the vertical
tube.
These infants then received the same lateral dark trials as
the infants
in the previous group. Infants in this group could not
have formed a
representation of the side trays and therefore should not
have searched
for the balls in those locations during dark
trials.
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results indicated that the infants in both groups would search
for the balls after the last auditory cue was heard. However, the
infants who saw the balls come to rest in the left/right trays during
the light events, oriented their heads and reached their hands in the
appropriate direction more often than the infants in the midline control
group. These results indicated that infants in the experimental group
were able to use perceptual knowledge of the event and the memory of the
spatial layout of the apparatus to reach and search appropriately in the
dark when no auditory or visual clues were available.
McCall and Clifton (1996) did a study where 8-month-old infants
looked for hidden objects without visual feedback. They point out that
previous studies of infants' searching can be questioned because
successful searching might occur because the infants were interested in
the opaque box hiding the object. Specifically, while playing with the
box, the infants might accidentally reveal the hidden toy. The infants
might then reach for the toy, but such search actions are not
necessarily guided by a representation of the hidden toy.
To avoid this confound, McCall and Clifton had infants search for
occluded objects in the dark. Infants had several training trials of
reaching and uncovering hidden objects in the light and were then tested
in the dark. At the start of each trial, infants saw the experimenter
attach a toy to a speaker, simultaneously close the cover and start
a
sound from the speaker, with the toy and cover out of reach.
The
experimenter then turned out the lights and slid the covered toy
to
within reach of the infant. Sound was provided to
guide infants'
initial reaching in the dark, but sound was turned
off as soon as the
infants opened the cover. This was done so that
subsequent reaches to
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the toy were made without any auditory or visual feedback. To answer
the question of whether infants' searching behavior was dependent on the
presence of a toy in the hiding place they implemented additional
trials. Before the lights were turned off, infants saw either: (1) the
cover closed with no toy underneath; or (2) saw a toy hidden underneath
the cover but it was surreptitiously removed after the lights were
turned off.
The results indicated that 18 out of 30 infants uncovered and then
reached again to retrieve the toy during the dark trials. Furthermore,
these infants used various strategies to retrieve the toy (e.g., holding
the cover with one hand while reaching with the other or reaching with a
single hand) which suggested to McCall and Clifton that the search
behavior was a goal-directed, means-end sequence guided by a
representation of the hidden toy. However, it was pointed out by the
authors that the infants searched just as frequently on trials where
there was no object and when the object was surreptitiously removed in
the dark, thus indicating a failure to differentiate trials with and
without an object. This finding suggested that infants either did not
encode whether a toy was hidden at the start of a trial, or they forgot
a toy was not placed under the cover
.
Finally, a study designed by Schilling and Clifton (under
revisions) tested whether infants could learn about an arbitrary event
in a few trials and show some sort of distinguishing behavior
when their
expectations were violated. In this study, infants aged
8.5- to
months were trained on two types of events with identical
yellow balls.
In one event the infants were given a yellow ball
which when opened
contained nothing. After the infants had played with
the ball, it was
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placed inside a clear plastic tube which was perpendicularly inserted
into the top of a metal box. In front of the tube and on top of the box
was a white paddle which when pressed activated a fan and forced a
column of air up the tube which pushed the ball to the top of the tube.
In another event, the infants were given another identical yellow ball;
however, when this ball was opened it contained another rubber ball with
colorful streamers. When this ball was placed in side the tube and the
paddle was pressed, it remained at the bottom of the tube.
During eight training trials, "light" balls rose and "heavy" balls
remained at the bottom of the tube when the paddle was pressed. There
were two types of test events: consistent events were those in which the
light balls rose and the heavy balls remained at the bottom of the tube
just as in the training trials; inconsistent events were those in which
the heavy ball rose and the light ball remained at the bottom when the
paddle was pressed.
Infants pressed longer and looked longer at the apparatus on the
inconsistent trials relative to the consistent ones. In a follow-up
study, infants of the same age were trained and tested with the opposite
phenomenon. These infants learned that "heavy" balls rose and "light"
balls remained at the bottom when the paddle was pressed. Next, they
were tested with events that were consistent or inconsistent with the
training events. During inconsistent events, the light ball rose and
the heavy ball remained at the bottom of the tube during paddle
pressing. As in the first study, the infants pressed longer
and looked
longer at the inconsistent events relative to the
consistent events.
These results suggested that infants could quickly
learn about an
arbitrary phenomenon and show some sort of distinguishing
behavior when
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what they learned was violated. Furthermore, infants could learn about
an arbitrary physical phenomenon, not just those that have some sort of
special status because they are based on the laws of physics. Research
such as Clifton et. al., (1991) and Schilling and Clifton suggest that
it may be more parsimonious to posit a perceptual learning mechanism
whereby the infant forms expectations by parsing and synthesizing
contiguously occurring events in the experimental situation.
D. The Familiarity Hypothesis
Baillargeon et al. (1985; Baillargeon, 1987) carefully controlled
for novelty effects in their paradigm, but they failed to take into
account that infants show familiarity preferences in certain situations.
Researchers have generally overlooked the importance of familiarity
preferences in infant habituation studies. Typically, it has been
assumed that once infants have reached some sort of habituation
criterion (even though such a criterion was stipulated prior to the
testing situation and may not necessarily reflect thorough encoding),
they should look longer to a novel stimulus. In a comprehensive review
of the literature regarding visual development, Aslin (1987) suggested
several reasons why an infant would fail to show discriminatory behavior
during test trials:
Failure to show evidence of dishabituation, however, could
indicate that (a) the "novel" stimulus was not sufficiently
different from the "familiar" stimulus to elicit increased
fixation, even though discrimination had occurred; (b) the
critical attributes or features of the "familiar" stimulus
were
not encoded during the habituation phase, thereby making
discrimination impossible: (c) the infant was capable ot
discriminating the two stimuli, but failed to fixate the cn
aspects of the stimuli that provided differential visual
information; or (d) the infant was in fact incapable
ot
discriminating any difference between the two stimuli, (p.
3.
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In this passage it is never discussed that infants might not look
longer to the novel stimulus because of some sort of familiarity
preference. That infants look longer to a familiar stimulus than a
novel one after some degree of habituation is not a new idea. In a
study by Weizmann, Cohen, and Pratt (1971), 4-week-old infants were
placed in a crib with a mobile for 30 minutes daily for a month. At 6-
and 8-weeks, the infants were presented with a novel mobile and a
familiar one. At 6-weeks, the infants looked longer to the familiar
mobile, and at 8-weeks, they looked longer to the novel mobile.
Weizmann et al . suggested that both manners of responding were
indicators of recognition.
The intersensory integration research done by Spelke (1976) has
relied on infants to exhibit a type of a familiarity preference. Four-
month-old infants were shown two movies side-by-side. One movie showed
a woman who hid her face with her hands and then uncovered it and said
"hello baby, peekaboo." In the other movie, a hand held a stick which
moved up and down and rhythmically struck a piece of wood. In the
center, between the two films, was a sound source which played a sound
that corresponded to one of the films. Most infants looked longer to
the screen which matched the appropriate sound source. The infants
could have preferred to look longer at the novel combination of visual
and auditory stimuli, and the same interpretation of infants' ability to
integrate sight and sound could have been made. Rose and Ruff (1987)
reported that studies of cross-modal abilities have generally
found that
infants younger than 6-months show familiarity preferences.
During the 1980's, much research was devoted to understanding
the
nature of information-processing of infants during
habituation. A
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specific line of this research focused on the time-course of processing
for schema-completion during habituation (Hunter, Ross, & Ames, 1982;
Rose, Gottfried, Melloy-Carminar
,
& Bridger, 1982; Hunter, Ames, &
Koopman, 1983; see also Hunter & Ames, 1988 for a review). An
interesting finding from this research is that, early in habituation,
infants attend longer to a familiar stimulus relative to a novel one and
show a preference for a novel stimulus only after a sufficient amount of
habituation has occurred. For example, Hunter et al. (1982)
investigated the playing time of one-year-old infants with familiar and
novel toys. One group of infants were allowed to play with the toys
until their playing time had decreased to meet a rather stringent
criterion for habituation. The other group were given a shorter playing
time with the familiar toy. It was predicted that the infants who had
been habituated would play longer with the novel than the familiar toys.
The other group would play longer with the familiar toy because they
have not finished processing it. As predicted, the habituated infants
played longer with a novel toy and infants given less familiarization
time played longer with a familiar toy.. The finding supports the claim
that short familiarization times can lead to longer attention to
familiar stimulus.
A familiarity preference was also found by Rose, Gottfried,
Melloy-Carminar, and Bridger (1982) who presented static stimuli
on a
screen for 30 seconds to infants aged 3.5-, 4.5-, and
6.5-months.
Younger infants showed familiarity preferences and
older infants showed
novelty preferences; there was a general
progressive shift for a
familiarity preference to a novelty preference with
age. Rose et al.
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argued that all infants show famil iarity preferences given a
sufficiently short familiarization time for a given age.
In a follow-up study by Rose et al. (1982), 3.5- and 6.5-month-
olds were given varying amounts of familiarization times and then were
presented with novel and familiar stimuli. Six-and-a-half-month-olds
who experienced 5 seconds of familiarization showed a familiarity
preference; those who experienced 10 seconds of familiarization showed
no preference; and infants who experienced 15 seconds of familiarization
showed a novelty preference. The 3 . 5-months-olds showed the same
familiarity-to-novelty preference trends; however, they needed
accumulated familiarization times of 10, 20, and 30 seconds to exhibit
this trend. These results indicate that infants show a familiarity
preference after experiencing a sufficiently short amount of
familiarization time. This familiarity preference can be used as an
index of the state of information-processing at the time of the test
trials
.
In a review of the habituation literature, Hunter and Ames (1988)
found that researchers reported both significant familiarity preferences
and novelty preferences in the literature. Infants show a significant
familiarity preference when they were given a sufficiently brief
exposure to a stimulus and when they were sufficiently young. Hunter and
Ames claimed that infants of all ages initially show a familiarity
preference and then a novelty preference, and the duration of
such
preferences are a function of both stimulus complexity and
age of the
infant
.
According to Hunter and Ames (1988), infants of all
ages will
show a familiarity preference given a sufficiently
short habituation
58
time and a sufficient amount of task difficulty. Therefore, it is
proposed that infants in Baillargeon et al. (1985) and Baillargeon
(1987) looked longer at the impossible event not because of some
inferred violation of physics on the part of the infants, but rather
because it was perceptually familiar. The infants did not have enough
exposure time during the habituation phase to thoroughly encode the 180°
movement of the moving paddle. During test trials, infants preferred
the familiar event, to the 120° novel event.
This familiartity hypothesis seems plausible when one considers
the data of the 3.5-month-old infants who looked significantly longer at
the impossible event. Only the fast habituators (i.e., infants who
habituated in 6 or 7 trials) preferred the 180° event; that is, infants
who had the least amount of exposure time looked longer at the
impossible event. In Baillargeon et al . (1985), the 5.5-month-old
infants reached habituation in 7.32 trials (as defined by a looking time
which had three consecutive trials with a mean looking time of 50% or
less than the mean looking time of the first three trials) . Using the
same habituation criterion, Baillargeon (1987) found that 4.5-month-old
infants reached the habituation criterion in 6.62 trials.
However, one cannot be sure to what extent the infants were
habituated using Baillargeon ' s decrement criterion. The infants may
have been looking for a long time on the first three trials because
of
the novel situation of the testing room, but not necessarily
because
they were actually attending to the event occurring m front of them.
This heightened attention could artifactually inflate
their looking time
on the first few trials (see Bernstein, 1985, for
a review of different
••styles" of habituation by infants). The data on the
graphs reported m
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the two papers show smooth habituation slopes suggesting that the
infants were habituated. However, these data may be the result of
"self-selection." The first three trials that reach this decrement
criterion may not indicate complete habituation. It is possible that
the infants reached this criterion by chance (e.g., Bogartz, 1965;
Bornstein, 1985) . For example, an infant may have had a lengthy look
during one of the first three trials which increased the initial score.
During one of the next three trials, this infant may have been
distracted and did not look at the stimuli, which decreased the average
for that block of trials. In this case, the infant would be considered
habituated, however it is questionable whether the infant really had an
opportunity to thoroughly encode the stimuli.
The familiarity hypothesis implies that infants ' looking is not
cognitively mediated, but rather guided by a simpler perceptual process.
Specifically, the familiarity hypothesis holds that with the habituation
criterion of Baillargeon et al . , (1985) and Baillargeon (1987), the
infants may not have had enough time to thoroughly encode the
habituation event. Therefore, during t^st trials, the infants attended
longer to the 180° impossible event than to the 120° event because the
former was perceptually more familiar.
F Ann! i cation of the Familiarity Hypothesis to the Moving Paddle
Studies
Can the familiarity hypothesis explain results in
Baillargeon
'
s
moving paddle studies, when infants in control groups
showed no mam
effect for the 180° or the 120° movement? If
the familiarity hypothesis
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is correct, all infants should look longer to the 180° event because it
is presumably familiar. However, in all analyses of the two studies,
there is no such main effect. Interestingly, there is a curious Order x
Event interaction in Baillargeon
' s studies. In Baillargeon et al.
(1985), a 2 Order (180°, 120° first) x 3 Trial (first, second, third
pair of test trials) x 2 Event (180°, 120° event) mixed analysis of
variance (ANOVA) with order as the between-subject factor was conducted.
The results indicated that the control infants looked significantly
longer at the apparatus during the first pair of test trials at the
180° event relative to the 120° event when the 180° event occurred
first, F ( 1 , 88) = 17.23, p < .001. However, this interaction did not
exist when the infants saw the 120° event first, F(l,88) = 1.17, p =
.28. The data are not plotted by order, but from the magnitude of the
overall difference between the 180° and the 120° event (M 180° event =
29 s; M 120° event = 18 s) and considering the size of the F-ratio, this
difference is large.
A similar result was also found in Baillargeon (1987)
.
Baillargeon used 2 Condition (experimental, control) x 2 Order
(possible/ 112° event, impossible/180 0 event first) x 4 Test Pair
(first, second, third, fourth test pair) x 2 Event (possible/112
0
,
impossible / 180°) mixed ANOVA with Condition and Order as between-subject
variables. There was a significant Order x Event interaction,
whereby
the infants who saw the impossible/180
0 event first looked longer at the
impossible/ 180° event than at the possible/112
0 event. When the infants
saw the possible/112 0 event first, they showed no overall
preference for
one event over the other. It is not clear
what the means are for this
interaction within the experimental and control
groups because the data
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were collapsed across the two conditions. Therefore, this result is
only suggestive that the infants may have looked longer at the 180°
event in the control condition when this event appeared first.
These results have implications for both the familiarity
hypothesis and Baillargeon ' s theory. Specifically, when the infants saw
a familiar test event (i.e., the 180° event) first on the first pair of
test trials, they exhibited a familiarity preference for the familiar
event rather than a novelty preference for a novel event (i.e., 112°
event) . This finding lends some support to the familiarity hypothesis
because the infants looked longer at a familiar event. However, when
they saw a novel event first, the infants did not show a preference.
This finding contradicts the familiarity hypothesis and supports
Baillargeon ' s theory that it is not the event itself which elicits
looking, but rather the cognitive novelty of the 180° impossible event.
These interactions suggest that further controls need to be implemented
to help rule out the possibility that infants' looking on the test
trials might be governed by a familiarity preference.
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CHAPTER VII
EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATION OF HABITUATION EVENTS AND AGE
A. Introduction
The following experiment was designed to examine the role that
habituation trials may play in the results described by Baillargeon et
.
al., (1985) and Baillargeon (1987). Specifically, the effects of
lengthening the familiarization trials, changing the type of
familiarization event, and age were examined using 4 conditions (3
groups of 4-month-olds, 1 group of 6-month-olds). All groups were run
simultaneously with 4-month-old infants randomly placed into one of the
testing conditions.
The time-course of information processing was observed by using a
paradigm similar to Baillargeon (1987) . In Group A, which replicated
Baillargeon ' s experiment, infants were given seven 180° familiarization
trials and tested with 180° impossible and 112° possible test events. It
is hypothesized that the infants would look longer at the 180 test
event. There are two explanations for this prediction. Baillargeon
claimed that the infants would look longer at the 180° event because it
is impossible. Alternatively, the familiarity hypothesis proposes that
infants have not completely encoded the familiarization event and
would
look longer at a perceptually familiar event. Group B examined
the
effect that increasing the number of habituation trials
(i.e., twelve
180° habituation events) has on infants' looking preferences during
the
test trials. According to the familiarity hypothesis,
the infants
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should have completely encoded the familiarization event and should
therefore prefer to look longer at a perceptually novel 112° test event.
According to Baillargeon
' s theory, the infants should look longer to the
180 impossible event because it is still impossible despite the number
of habituation trials.
Group C examined the effect that reversing the habituation event
(i.e., habituating to seven 112° events) has on looking times to the
possible and impossible test events. The prediction derived from the
familiarity hypothesis is that infants have not had enough trials to
encode the familiarization event and would look longer at the 112°
perceptually familiar event. Again, it can be inferred from
Baillargeon ' s theory, that the infants should look longer to the 180°
event because it is still impossible despite the type of habituation
trials
.
Finally, Group D examined the effect that manipulating age has on
looking times to the two test events. In this experiment 6-month-old
infants were given seven 180° habituation events. According to the
familiarity hypothesis, 6-month-old infants who are presumably faster
information processors, would look longer to a perceptually novel test
event. In contrast, Baillargeon ' s theory would predict that the infants
should look longer at the impossible event.
If the results turn out as hypothesized, these data would provide
compelling evidence that what guides the infants' looking behavior is
perceptually based and can be explained parsimoniously with relatively
well understood information-processing capabilities which
underlie the
habituation. This idea contradicts early theories which hold
that
infants look longer at the 180° impossible event on the
test trials
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because it violates an inferred law of physics and is therefore
cognitively novel. Finally, if the data support the familiarity
hypothesis, then researchers may want to focus greater attention on
perceptual processes and how these processes underlie the development of
cognitive activity which emerges during the course of later infancy.
However, if it is found that infants of both age groups and
habituation groups look longer at the impossible event, then this would
provide strong support for Baillargeon ' s interpretation that infants can
overcome the tendency to look longer at a perceptually novel event and
attend to the cognitively-inferred aspects of test trial events. Such a
result would support the theories of Spelke and Baillargeon and that
manipulating the information processing demands on the infants through
habituation does not affect whether or not infants look longer at the
impossible event.
B. Method
1 . Participants
In Group A, twenty infants (8 males, 13 females) who were between
the ages of 4 months + or - 10 days (M = 4 mo, 3 days) participated in
the study. All parents reported that at birth, their infants were
fullterm, healthy and heavier than 2500 g. An additional 4 infants
were
tested and eliminated from the Group-Because of fussiness (3) and
experimenter error (1)
.
In Group B, twenty infants (7 males, 13 females) between
the ages
of 4 months + or - 10 days (M = 3 mo 27 days)
participated. An
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additional 6 infants were tested but dropped because of fussiness (4)
and experimental error (2)
.
In Group C, twenty infants (10 males, 10 females) between the ages
of 4 months + or - 10 days (M = 4 mo 8 days) participated. An
additional 4 infants were tested but dropped because of fussiness (4)
.
Finally, in Group D, twenty infants (10 males, 10 females) between
the ages of 6 months + or - 10 days (M = 6 mo, 7 days) participated.
An additional 4 infants were tested but dropped because of fussiness (3)
and experimental error (1).
All infants were tested at the Infant Studies Laboratory at Tufts
University in Medford, MA. Names of parents and infants were obtained
from public birth records at local city halls. The parents of potential
participants were mailed a letter that explained the general nature of
the lab procedures. Interested parents were requested to mail an
enclosed card to indicate that they were willing to become part of a
participant pool. All potential participants were drawn from this pool.
When the infants approached the appropriate ages, a lab visit was
scheduled. All parents were required to sign a consent form that had a
written description of the procedure. After the testing session, all
parents were debriefed regarding the hypotheses of the study, given an
opportunity to ask questions, and the infants were given a t-shirt and
certificate for their participation.
2 . Stimuli and Apparatus
The stimuli and apparatus were similar to that
used in Baillargeon
(1987) . The moving paddle was a white, foam-core
paddle 20.3 cm
66
18.4 cm high that was situated on a black box 38.1 cm long x 10.8 cm
high x 22.9 cm wide. The block (18 cm long x 10 cm high x 1 cm. thick)
had black and white checkerboard stripes and was large enough so that
the paddle would hit it if the paddle progressed any further than 112°.
In addition, movement of the block was controlled by an experimenter who
used a lever to raise and lower the block. To raise the block, the
experimenter pulled a string which lifted the block from the rear base
of the apparatus. To lower the block, the experimenter released the
string and the block rested flush with the apparatus. This experimenter
was able to raise and lower the block while positioned behind the rear
center-panel (from the infants' point of view) of a four-sided screen
which sat on the same table as the apparatus. There was a small hole in
the lower right corner of the rear center screen, through which an
experimenter could see the movement of the paddle. Attached on either
side of the center panel were two blinders which prevented the infants
from seeing the experimenters and the rest of the lab room. In front of
the infants was a curtain which could be opened and closed by the
experimenter behind the rear center screen. When the curtain was
closed, infants could no longer see the apparatus.
The movement of the paddle was controlled by a Cybermation SCK-
2000 controller kit. The controller card was mounted underneath the
black base of the moving paddle. The moving paddle was run by a
12-volt
AC Center Tap, 4 amp transformer which powered a 12-volt stepper
motor.
Software for an IBM compatible computer allowed the parameters
of the
speed and the degrees of arc of the moving paddle movement
to be set
prior to the start of a trial. The movement of the
moving paddle was
controlled by a computer to avoid problems of potential
experimenter
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bias and/or error resulting from manually turning handcranks to the beat
of a metronome as was done in the research by Baillargeon (1987).
The length of trials and looking data were recorded by a computer.
The software cued the experimenter when to begin a trial, when to end a
trial, and when a specific number of trials had been reached. All
testing sessions were videotaped by a Sony Camcorder video camera which
recorded a direct view of the infants' gazes to the paddle. All data
were copied from the 8 mm camcorder tape onto VHS VCR tapes with a date-
timer image superimposed on every frame in .01 second.
3 . Procedure -Overview
The infants were seated in a car seat during the entire procedure.
The parents were seated next to the infants to the right of the right
blinder. This arrangement allowed parents and infants to see each othe*
without permitting parents to view the apparatus. Before the
habituation trials started, parents were reminded not to interact with
the infants while the curtain was open. After a trial ended and the
curtains were closed, parents were permitted to gently pat or talk to a
fussy infant during the intertrial period.
Two experimenters participated in this procedure. One
experimenter scored looking time from a video monitor and
initiated and
terminated the paddle movement at the beginning and end
of a trial. A
second experimenter opened and closed the curtains
at the beginning and
end of a trial. This experimenter also
raised and lowered the block
attached to the apparatus. This block served
as the obstacle in the
path of the moving paddle during the test
trials. A trial started
68
with a single button press on the PC keyboard which in turn, activated
the moving paddle to begin its arc. Once a trial began, the
experimenter was able to begin scoring using a button press that was
connected to the Macintosh computer.
4 . Procedure
For Groups A, B, and C, 4-month-old infants were randomly placed
into one of the experimental groups. The group with the 6-month-olds
was run simultaneously with the three 4-month-old groups. Within all of
the four testing groups infants were randomly placed into one of two
groups with different testing orders. Half of the infants (n = 10) were
in a group which viewed the 180° test event first, 112° test event
second, 112° test event third, and 180° test event fourth. The other
half (n = 10) experienced test trials in just the opposite order. The
computer alerted the experimenter as to what type of trial to run (i.e.,
180° event, 112° event with block, 180° with block).
The onset and length of trials for all groups is similar to that
found in Baillargeon (1987) . A trial began with a .1 second (s)
fixation to the paddle and continued until the infants accumulated 5
consecutive seconds of looking time to the paddle. If the infant looked
away for 2 consecutive seconds after the accumulation criterion was
met ;
then the trial ended. Otherwise, a trial ended after the infant
accumulated 60 s of looking time to the paddle.
During the 180-degree habituation trials (as used m Groups A, B,
s, D)
,
the paddle moved through a 180° arc (without a block) at
a rate o£
45°/s. During the 4 test trials, the paddle moved
through a 180° arc
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(with the block present) at the rate of 45°/s, and through a 112° arc
(with the block present) at the same speed. In Group C, where the
infants were habituated to a paddle movement of 112°, the paddle moved
at a rate of 45°/s. During the test trials, the movement and speed of
the paddle remained the same as the test events in the other
experimental groups.
The presentation of trials is slightly different from the study of
Baillargeon (1987). Because the computer controlled the movement of the
paddle, there were no pauses while the direction of the paddle movement
was changed. Furthermore, because the block was resting on the rear of
the base on which the paddle was attached instead of being raised and
lowered on a platform as in the study of Baillargeon (1987), there was
no need to stop the paddle at 45° to raise and lower the block.
Instead, one experimenter was able to raise and lower the block by
simply pulling and releasing a string attached to an arm on the side of
the block. The absence of pauses should reduce any potential
disruptions to the infants that might interfere with information-
processing during the trials. \
5 . Scoring
All trials from all participants were scored several times.
Initially, all infants were scored live during the testing session.
Online scoring was necessary because the computer controlled
trial
length based on accumulated looking time. One experimenter
watched a
video monitor which captured the infant's gaze and the
apparatus. This
70
experimenter who was not blind to condition was able to hit keys on a
keyboard which recorded the looking time of each gaze.
All participants' data were also scored offline from videotapes.
Two independent scorers used a VCR that had a shuttle control to score
the videotapes. This shuttle enabled the scorer to stop the tape at
precisely the point where a look began and to advance the tape to the
point where the look had terminated. Each scorer was blind to the type
of trial being presented (i.e., 112° or 180°) because only the first 45°
and last 45° of the paddle movement was videotaped.
The scorers began each trial to make sure the infants had
accumulated 5 consecutive seconds of looking time to the apparatus at
the start of each trial. Each scorer marked the time that an infant
began a directed gaze to the apparatus, advanced the tape, and marked
the time when the infants stopped looking at the apparatus. The scorers
then advanced the tape through the non-looking interval to make sure
that 2 consecutive seconds had not elapsed. This scoring procedure was
continued for each looking and non-looking period on every trial for
each infant . \
If a scorer found that an infant had not accumulated 5 consecutive
seconds at the start of a trial, the infant's data were dropped. One
infant's data were dropped in Group D for this reason. Also, an
infant ' s data were eliminated if a scorer found that an infant had
actually looked away from the apparatus for more than 2 consecutive
seconds and that the experimenter had failed to terminate the
trial.
Infant's data were dropped from Group A (n = 1) and Group B (n
= 2) tor
this reason.
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The data from the two scorers were then compared. When there was
more than a 2 second difference in accumulated looking time between the
two scorers for a particular trial, a third person scored the trial. If
there was no agreement between any two scorers at this point (using the
2 second rule), the subject's data would have been eliminated. This did
not occur for any of the infant's data.
The data for all of the trials for both scorers for each
experiment were analyzed using Pearson's correlation coefficient. In
Group-A (as in all of the other groups), 100% of the trials scored by
one scorer was in agreement with another scorer (i.e., within 2 seconds)
for accumulated looking time/trial; r = .96; Group-B had an interrater
agreement of .98; Group-C had an interrater agreement of .96; finally,
Study D had an interrater agreement of .98.
C. Results and Discussion
The data were analyzed in two parts. Initial analyses examined
the level of habituation achieved by infants in the four groups. The
second part of the analyses described dishabituation and discrimination
between the two types of test trials. The data from Groups A-D are
summarized in Figures 1-4.
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Fig. 7.1. (Group A) Four-month-old infants' looking time (in seconds)
during 7 180° habituation and 4 test trials.
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Group B
Fig. 7.2. (Group B) Four-month-old infants' looking time
during 12 180° habituation and 4 test trials.
(in seconds)
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Fig. 7.3. (Group C) Four-month-old infants' looking time (in seconds)
during 7 112° habituation and 4 test trials.
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Group D
Fig. 7.4 . (Group D) Six-month-old infants' looking time (in seconds)
during 7 180° habituation and 4 test trials.
1 . Habituation Data
Baillargeon (1987) operationalized habituation as a decrease in
looking time to the habituation stimulus that has a mean looking time of
50% or less for three consecutive trials than the mean looking time for
the first three habituation trials. The data from the four testing
groups in the current Experiment were examined to see how many infants
achieved this habituation criterion. The data are summarized m Table
7.1.
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Table 7.1
Number of infants who reached Baillargeon
' s (1987) habituation criterion
in Group A (7-180°, 4-month-olds), B (12-180°, 4-month-olds), C (7-112°
4-month-olds), and D (7-180°, 6-month-olds) (n = 20 in all groups).
Group A B C D
Number Reached 13 13 9 14
Habituation
Criterion
Considering this experiment used a fixed number of trials, it is
not surprising that not all of the infants reached Baillargeon '
s
decrement criterion within 7 trials in Groups A-D. However, despite the
fixed number of trials, it is surprising that only 13 of 20 infants in
Group B reached the decrement criterion considering that they had 12
habituation trials presumably providing sufficient time to thoroughly
encode the event
.
To further investigate the habituation of the different groups, a
one-way between groups ANOVA was performed to determine if the
accumulated habituation times differed between groups. It was expected
that the infants in Groups A and C would have equivalent accumulated
habituation times because both groups used 4-month-old infants and had 7
habituation trials. It was also expected that the infants m Group B
would have significantly more accumulated looking time during
habituation than the other three groups because they had 12
habituation
trials. Finally, it was expected that infants in Group
D would have
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significantly less accumulated looking time (even though they had 7
habituation trials) because they were 6-months-old and should encode the
habituation event more quickly. In fact, the ANOVA indicated that
infants in all four experiments did not have accumulated looking times
that were significantly different, F ( 3
,
76) = .16, n£ (see Table 7.2).
Table 7.2
Accumulated habituation times for Group: A (7-180°, 4-month-olds)
,
B
(12-180°, 4-month-olds), C (7-112° 4-month-olds), and D (7-180°, 6-
month-olds) (n = 20 in all groups)
.
Group A
Accumulated M 127.6
Looking Time SD 67.4
F ( 3
,
76) = .16, ns
BCD
145.2 130.1 135.8
111.7 80.9 81.5
Finally, to indicate the degree of decrement in looking during the
course of habituation, the average of the first three trials was
compared to the average of the last thrtee trials. The infants in Groups
A, C, & D showed significant decrease in looking between the first three
and last three habituation trials. However, the infants in Group-B did
not show a significant decrement in looking between the first three and
last three habituation trials. Because of the low level of looking
during the initial trials it would be very difficult to reach the
habituation criterion (see Table 7.3). The lack of a smooth downward
habituation slope is also due to 16 of the 20 infants showing a
fluctuating pattern (i.e., a bimodal function that has at least
two
reversals of direction and has at least one one peak
higher and/or lower
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than the habituation criterion) of looking during the habituation
trials. However, it is still possible that they encoded that
habituation event but any results results from this group need to be
interpreted with caution.
Table 7.3
Decline in looking (in seconds) during habituation as measured by
difference in average of first three and last three habituation trials
for Group: A (7-180°, 4-month-olds), B (12-180°, 4-month-olds), C (7-
112° 4-month-olds), and D (7-180°, 6-month-olds) (n = 20 in all groups).
Group First Three Trials Last Three Trials
A M 26.2 11.8
14.1 6.4
t (19) 5.1*
B M 14 .
1
10.2
SD 9 . 11.4
t (19) 1.4
C M 23.2 13.6
16.7 10.1
t (19) 2.9**
D M 26.6 10.9
£D 14 .
6
8.9
£(19) 6.3**
* £ < .05
** £ < .01
2 . Dishabituation Data
The initial analysis of the test trial data determined whether the
infants showed any evidence of dishabituation. Using a paired means
£-
test, the data were examined by taking the average of the last
two
habituation trials and comparing that with each of the four test
trials
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(i.e.,. 180°-1, 112°-2
,
180°-2, 112°-2) individually and with the average
of each type of test trial (i.e., 180° and 112° test events).
It was expected that there would be no dishabituation for the 4-
month-old infants who received 7 180° and 112° habituation trials
because it was thought that 7 habituation trials would not be enough to
be thoroughly habituated. For the infants who received the 12 180°
habituation trials, it was expected that they would show significant
dishabituation to the perceptually novel event (i.e., the 112° test
event) because 12 trials was thought to be enough to sufficiently encode
the 180° habituation event. Finally, for the 6-month-old infants who
received the 7 180° habituation trials, it was expected that they would
dishabituate to the perceptually novel event (i.e., 112° test event)
because 7 habituation trials should be enough to completely encode the
180° event (see Table 7.4).
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Table 7.4
Comparison of the average of the last two habituation trials with 180°
and 112° test events in seconds for Groups A-D.
Test Event
Last 2
Trials
180°-1 112°- 1 180°-2 112°-2 180° 112°
Group M 10 .,7 12. 91 10 . 41 14 . 09 8. 94 13 . 52 9. 71
A SD 5..95 13 . 6 9 . 2 9 . 97 7 . 27 9 . 98 6. 93
t (19) 64 1 -1. 48 1. 07 -1. 1 51
M 9 ,.54 7 .,01 9..47 4 . 85 15..85 5..95 12.,69
B £D 9..5 6..28 10..83 4 . 39 19 ,.76 4 . 15 14 . 39
£ (19) 1.. 5 . 04 2 ..87** -1 .97 2 .. 45*
*r
-1.
.51
M 11 .49 8 . 23 16 .5 7 ,.72 13 .06 8 .0 14,.73
C SD 10 .57 7 . 64 14 .93 9 .27 14 .67 6 .92 11 .64
£.(19) 1 .41 -1 .45 1 .78* - .51 1 .81* -1 .28
M 8 .45 8 .73 9 .91 7 .88 9 .45 8 .34 9 .68
D SD 7 .41 8 .86 9 .38 10 .35 13 .82 6 .88 8 . 1
£(19) - . 1 - .66 .25 - .3 .06 - .61
* p < .05
** p < .005
\
As expected, the 4-month-old infants who were habituated to / 180
events (Group A) did not show any significant differences between the
average of the last two habituation trials and any of the test trials,
£(19), ns for all comparisons.
The 4-month-old infants who had 12 habituation trials (Group B)
looked an average of 9.54 s (SD = 9.5 s) during the last two habituation
trials and showed a different pattern of looking during the test
trials.
During the first two test trials, the looking time to the
familiar event
(i.e., 180°- 1 ) continued to decline to a level approaching
statistical
significance (M 180°-1 = 7.01 s, £D = 6.28 s, £(19)
= 1.5, p = -07)
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although the looking time to the novel 112° event was statistically
equal to the last two habituation trials (M 112°-1 = 9.47 s
, 2£ = 10.83
s, £.(19) = .04, ns.. The pattern of declining looking time to the
familiar event continued during the second test phase (M 180°-2 = 4.85
s, SD = 4.39 s, £(19) = 2'. 87
, p < .005) . There was a significant
increase in looking time to the novel event in the second test phase (M
112°-2 = 15.85 s, SD = 19.76 s, £(19) = -1.97, p < .05)
.
Overall, the
infants in this group looked significantly less to familiar event (M
180° = 5.95 s, SD = 4.15 s, £(19) = 2.45, q_< .05), and they showed a
trend of looking significantly longer to the novel event (M 112° = 12.69
s, SD = 14.39 s, £(19) = -1.51, p = .07).
These data suggest that the infants in Group B continued to
habituate to the familiar 180° test event during test phases 1 and 2,
and dishabituated to the novel 112° test event. This is an interesting
pattern of looking because these infants only showed a 28% decline in
looking time from the average of the first three habituation trials to
the last three habituation trials. This finding suggests that perhaps
it is not necessarily the decline in looking time or the accumulated
amount of looking time during the habituation trials which is important
to show dishabituat ion but that the number of trials may be important.
It is not clear why this might be the case, but it may be that by
organizing their attention to the apparatus many times at the start of
each trial may have forced the infants to focus attention to thoroughly
encode the 180° habituation events.
The infants who had 7 112° habituation events (Group C) looked
for
an average of 11.49 s (SD = 10.57 s) during the last two
habituation
trials. These infants looked less at the novel
180° events at test (M =
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8.0 s, SD - 6.92 s, £.(19) = 1.81, e < .05), and showed a trend (although
not significant) of looking longer at the familiar 112° test event when
compared to the last two habituation trials (M = 14.73 s, ££) = 11.64 s,
t (19) = -1.28, p > .05)
.
The infants in Group' C showed an overall significant decline in
looking to the novel event as compared to the average of the last two
habituation trials. As expected, both within and overall the two test
phases, the infants did not look longer to the perceptually familiar
event. The looking times to the 112° event indicated that the infants
were still interested in processing the familiar event and disinterested
in processing the novel event. Such data suggested the infants did not
move on to another event until a previous event has been processed.
Finally, the 6-month-old infants who were habituated to 7 180°
(Group D) events looked an average of 8.45 s (SD = 7.41 s) . However,
they failed to show any dishabituation or continued habituation to any
of the test events. The 6-month-olds infants' looking during the test
phases seemed to have declined to a plateau, and the infants looked to
the moving paddle only because there was nothing else at which to look.
It may be possible that at 6-months, 7 trials and the particular trial
criterion used in the current experiments may bore these infants.
3 . Test Event Discrimination Data
To examine if infants in the various experimental groups
discriminated between test events, a 2 Order (180° or 112° event
first)
x 2 Test Pair (TP 1 or TP 2) x 2 Event (180° or 112°)
mixed ANOVA (with
order as the between variable) was performed. In Group A m which
4-
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month-old infants were habituated to 7 180° trials, the analysis
edited that infants did discriminate the two events by looking longer
to the 180° test event (M = 13.5 s) than to the 112° test event (U
9.71 s), F ( 1 , 18) = 6.96, p < .02, MSE = 41.93 (see Figure 7.1, p. 73.).
Additionally, there was a Test Pair x Trial Type x Order interaction
whereby infants who had the 180° event first (order 1) had a interaction
of trial type x test pair, whereas infants who saw the 180° event second
(order 2) did not (see Figure 5).
Order 1 (180° First) Order 2 (112° First)
Looking
Time
Seconds
Fig. 7.5. Interaction of Test Pair x Trial ’Type x Order for Group A.
Even though the infants did not show any dishabituation in Group
A, they did discriminate between the two test events and looked
significantly longer to the 180° familiar (and "impossible") event.
This finding was predicted by both Baillargeon ' s cognitive
novelty
theory (i.e., the infants looked longer to the
180° event because it
violates the laws of physics) and the familiarity hypothesis
(i.e., the
infants looked longer to the 180° event because it was
perceptually
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familiar to the event not completely encoded during the habituation
trials) . However, looking at the Test Pair x Trial Type x Order
interaction, it is clear that the infants who saw the 180° event first
were inflating the looking time to the 180° test event and deflating the
looking time to the 112° test event. It is not apparent why this
interaction occurred, however it is similar to interactions found in
Baillargeon et al
.
(1985) and Baillargeon (1987).
In Group B, 4-month-old infants looked significantly longer at the
perceptually novel 112° test event after receiving 12 180° habituation
trials (see Figure 7.2, p. 66). Specifically, the 2 Order (180° or 112°
event first) x 2 Test Pair ( 1 or 2 ) x 2 Event (180° or 112°) mixed ANOVA
(with order as a between subject variable) revealed that infants looked
significantly longer at the 112° possible (M = 12.69 s) test event than
to the 180° impossible (M = 5.95 s) test event, F(l, 18) = 5.76, p <
.05, ( MSE = 157.39). The analysis also indicated that infants looked
longer to the 112° test event during the second test pair than during
first test pair, F(l, 18) = 8.58, p < .05, MSE = 41.58 (see Figure 7.6).
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Fig. 7.6. Interaction of Test Pair x Trial Type for Group B.
In Group B, after being habituated to 12 180° trials, the infants
looked longer to the perceptually novel 112° test event. This finding
provides support for the familiarity hypothesis but not necessarily in
the manner expected. The familiarity hypothesis held that a high amount
of accumulated looking time would lead the infants to look longer to the
pgjfceptua 1 ly novel test event. However, the habituation data indicated
that these infants accumulated no more looking time than the infants in
the experimental groups who had only 7 habituation trials. Again, this
finding is likely a result of the infants not looking longer at the
initial habituation trials than later trials. In addition, this was the
only condition in which infants failed to habituate 'see Table 7.3, p.
75)
.
Perhaps it is not necessarily the amount of accumulated looking
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time which is important for encoding an event, but the number of trials
that infants experience that may play a role in determining what infants
will look at during the test trials. This is only a speculation and
requires further testing for confirmation.
The Test Pair x Trial Type interaction indicated that infants'
increased looking at the 180° event and decreased looking at the 112°
event during the second test phase contributed to the overall difference
between the 180° and 112° events. There is no obvious explanation for
this pattern of results. One might expect that the infants should
dishabituate to the 112° event during the first test phase and show
converging looking time with the 180° event during the subsequent test
phases. It might be the case that seeing two different events re-
elicited information processing in the infants and that they began to
actively compare the test events again. Clearly such a hypothesis would
need further investigation.
In Group C, the 4-month-old infants who received 7 112°
habituation events continued to look longer to the 112° test event (M =
14.73 s) compared with the 180° test event (M = 8.0 s, F(l, 18) = 6.29,
p < .03, MSE = 147.55) (see Fig. 7.3, p. 75). No other main effects nor
interactions were found.
Performance in this experimental group provides the strongest
support for the familiarity hypothesis. Instead of looking at the
"impossible" event, the infants looked longer at the perceptually
familiar "possible" event. This finding suggests that what, how much,
and possibly how often an event was seen during habituation plays
a
large role in what the infants will look at during the test
trials.
This conclusion is significant vis-a-vis Baillargeon (1987)
who claimed
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that habituation merely familiarizes infants to the "strange apparatus"
and focuses their interest on the apparatus so that they will show
discriminatory behavior during the test trials. According to this
logic, the infants could be habituated to any movement of the paddle and
should still look longer at the 180° test event. Clearly, the
performance of the infants in this experimental group warn experimenters
against passive acceptance of this assumption.
For the 6-month-old infants in Group D, the 2 Order (180° or 112°
event first) x 2 Test Pair ( 1 or 2 ) x 2 Event (180° or 112°) mixed ANOVA
with order as a between-subj ect variable revealed no significant main
effects and no interactions for the 6-month-old infants who received 7
habituation trials. This finding was surprising because these infants
accumulated the same amount of habituation time as the infants in the
other groups, a greater number reached Baillargeon ' s habituation
criterion (14), and they had the greatest percentage decrease in looking
time from the first three trials to the last three trials compared to
the infants in the other three experimental groups (see Table 7.3, p.
67 ) .
The infants in all four groups failed to show any significant sex
differences in looking at the 180° or 112° test events. In Group A, the
8 males and the 12 females looked an average of 16.3 s and 11.7 s
respectively at the 180° test events (F(l, 18) = 1.001, ns, MSE =
99.59) . During the 112° test events, the males looked and average of
9.3 s and the females looked an average of 9.9 s, (F (1,18)
- .04, ns)
In Group B, the 7 males looked an average of 8.07 s and the
females
looked an average of 4.5 s at the 180° test events, (F (1,18)
= 4.07,
ns, MSE = 14.84). During the 112° test events, the males
looked an
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average 18.13 s and the females looked an average of 9.05 s, (£(1, 18) =
2.005, na, M£E = 196.77). During the 180° test events for infants in
Group C, the 10 males looked an average of 8.34 s and the 10 females
looked an average of 7.66 s, (F (1,18) = .04, qs, MSE = 50.39). The
male infants looked at the 112° events 12.53 s and the females looked
16.94 s, (F (1, 18) = .71, ns.) . Finally, the 10 male infants in Group D
looked at the 180° test events an average of 9.05 s and the 10 females
looked an average of 7.62 s, (F (1, 18) = .65, ns, MSE = 49.46). During
the 112° test events, the males looked an average of 11.23 s and the
females looked an average of 8.14 s, (F (1, 18) = .41, ns, MSE = 66.67).
The final dependent variables examined were infants' familiarity
and novelty preferences on the test trials. Such an index is not
unusual in habituation studies (Olson & Sherman, 1983) and allows one to
compare the obtained value against 50% using a one-sample t-test. An
index of visual preference is simple to obtain, (Percent to Novel =
Total to New / (Total to New + Total to Old) x 100) . Significant
departure below 50% indicates a familiarity effect, whereas an obtained
value significantly above 50% indicates a novel preference.
Visual preferences were examined within each of the two test
phases as well as the average of the two test phases for all four
experimental groups. Additionally, a 2 Order (180° first or second) x _
Test Pair (Test Pair 1, Test Pair 2) mixed ANOVA was performed to rule
out effects due to counterbalancing. Because of the few number of
habituation trials, it was expected that 4-month-old infants who
received only 7 180° habituation trials (Groups A & C) would show
significant familiarity preferences (i.e., prefer the 180° test
event).
Infants who received 12 180° habituation trials (Group-B) should
show
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significant novelty preferences to the 112° test event because it is
perceptually novel. Finally, 6-month-olds who were habituated with 7
180 (Group-D) events should show novelty preferences to the 112° test
event because of faster and more thorough encoding of the habituation
event
.
The results indicated that during Test Phase 2 of Group A, the
infants showed a significant familiarity preference (M = 37.95, £D =
21.77, t(19) = -2.48, p < .05) and an average familiarity preference (M=
42.95, SD = 16.24, t.19) = -1.94, p < .05) . The infants in Group B
demonstrated significant novelty preferences during Test Phase 2 (M =
61.9, SD = 23.68, t.(19) = 2.25, p < .05). These infants indicated an
overall novelty preference when the preferences across the two test
phases were averaged (M = 56.65, SD = 17.29, p(19) = 1.72, p < .05) . In
Group C, the analyses indicated a familiarity preference that was
significant in Test Phase 1 (M = 36.45, SD = 22.56, p(19) = -2.69, p <
.05) and approached significance in Test Phase 2 (M = 42.1, SD = 24.55,
p(19) = -1.44, p = .08). The infants exhibited a significant
familiarity preference when the test phases were averaged (M = 39.5, SD
= 16.14, t(19) = -2.91, p < .05). Finally, the infants in Group D did
not exhibit familiarity or novelty preferences during the test trials.
All preferences and analyses are summarized in Table 7.5.
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Table 7.5 Familiarity and
Groups A-D
novelty preferences during test trials for
Novelty Percentage
Group Test Phase 1 Test Phase 2 Average
A
7 180° M 47.45 37.95 42.95
4
-month-olds SD 17.82 21.77 16.24
t (19) -.64 -2.48 ** -1.94 *
B
12 180° M 51.0 61.9 56.65
4-month-olds SD 19.98 23.68 17.29
t (19) .22 2.25
*
1.72
*
C
7 112° M 36.45 42.1 39.5
4-month-olds SD 22.56 24.55 16.14
t (19)
Jr Jr
-2.69 -1.44 -2 .91***
D
7 180° M 55.1 51.0 53.3
6-month-olds SD 27.03 23.35 17.26
t (19) .84 .19 .86
* p < .05
** E < -01
*** p <. 005
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CHAPTER VIII
OVERALL DISCUSSION
iL The Importance of Familiarity Effects?
The results of the experiments reported here provide mixed
evidence for the familiarity hypothesis. The purpose of running infants
in Group-A was to replicate Baillargeon et al. (1985) and Baillargeon
(1987) to make sure that the basic phenomenon of longer looking to the
180° test event could be re-elicited after a comparable number of
habituation trials were given to four-month-old infants. After seven
habituation trials, the infants in Group-A did look longer to the 180°
test event. However, it remained unclear whether this looking was due
to detecting a violation of physics or due to a preference for a
familiar event.
The procedure used in Group C was designed to begin to disentangle
these competing explanations. The four-month-old infants in this group
were familiarized to seven 112° movements of the paddle and given the
same 180° and 112° test events as the other groups. These infants
looked significantly longer to the familiar 112° test event. Such a
finding may be at odds with Baillargeon ' s interpretation that infants
will look longer to a cognitively novel event (i.e., the 180° test
event) after habituation. These results provide some evidence that
infants may be preferring to look at whatever event is familiar
regardless of the event's physical plausibility.
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The procedure used in Group B was designed to further test the
familiarity hypothesis by increasing the number of habituation trials.
It was hoped that twelve habituation trials would allow the infants to
thoroughly encode the 180° movement of the paddle and that on test
trials they would prefer the perceptually novel 112° event. They did in
fact prefer the 112° event, but this result must be interpreted
cautiously because this group failed to show a decline in looking during
habituation. The lack of declining looking is attributable to a sample
of infants who did not look very long during the initial trials. In
habituation studies it is not unusual to have a few infants who do not
look very long during the initial trials (Bornstein, 1985)
,
however it
is unusual to have a majority of the sample show such minimal looking.
As a result of this habituation pattern (which presumably is a result of
sampling error)
,
the results of Group B need to be interpreted
cautiously
.
With the proceeding caveat in mind, these data provide some
indication that after 12 habituation trials infants looked longer to the
112° event. Such results provide tenuous support for the familiarity
hypothesis. After enough encoding time, the infants looked longer to a
perceptually novel rather than a cognitively novel event. However, this
interpretation needs to be further attenuated. The infants in this
Group-Accumulated no more looking time during habituation than infants
in the other three groups suggesting that the amount of accumulated
looking time is not the only determinante for event preferences during
test trials. It might be possible that the number of habituation trials
is an important factor in determining test trial preferences.
With each
habituation trial the infant has to organize and sustain their attention
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to the apparatus. The more often infants have to organize and sustain
their attention the greater the likelihood of thoroughly encoding of the
habituation event. Of course such an ad hoc interpretation needs to be
further tested to be confirmed. In Study D, the 6-month-olds exhibited
a very nice habituation curve and accumulated as much looking time
during habituation as the other groups, yet failed to show any
significant preferences. This finding is particularly troublesome for
the familiarity hypothesis because it was expected with the increased
processing speed of 6-month-olds, they would have shown a significant
novelty preference. One might argue that these infants were at an
intermediate level of processing where perhaps they were moving from a
familiarity preference to a novelty preference. However, this
interpretation is unlikely given the steep slope of the habituation
curve. It is not clear how these data can be reconciled with the
familiarity hypothesis.
Baillargeon may have a plausible interpretation for the 6-month-
olds' data. Baillargeon, Kotovsky, & Needham (1995) reported data that
indicated 6-month-old infants failed to show any significant preferences
during test trials after being habituated in the same manner as
Baillargeon (1987) . Baillargeon concluded that the infants were
"...responding simultaneously to both the physical novelty of the
impossible event and the perceptual novelty of the possible event" (p.
92) . Baillargeon tested a second group of 6.5-month-old infants with
only one habituation trial to the 180° possible event and found that
they looked longer to a subsequent 180° impossible event. According
to
Baillargeon, these infants did not accumulate enough time to
realize
that the 112° possible event was perceptually novel.
These results
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support both the familiarity hypothesis and a cognitive-perceptual
processing flip-flop hypothesis. It should be remembered that by 6-
months
,
infants are able to sit up and may move around. Furthermore,
their visual system is more acute than at four months, and there is more
information to obtain from the environment. It might be possible that
the 6 . 5-months-old infants quickly processed the moving paddle event and
then became more interested in other things. Perhaps one trial might be
sufficient to show a familiarity preference, and maybe 2 or 3 trials
would be sufficient to show a novelty preference. With more habituation
trials, 6.5-month-old infants may become bored with the entire procedure
and not show any sort of discriminatory behavior during the test trials.
Anecdotal evidence from Group D suggests that by the time these infants
got to the test trials, they were more interested in playing with their
feet or the car seat than paying attention to the apparatus. More
research needs to be conducted to explore, in detail, the time-course of
processing by 6-month-olds in the moving paddle paradigm. Such research
would reveal at what point infants begin to show novelty preferences and
may provide possible clues as to why infants switch their interest from
cognitively novel to perceptually novel events.
These results provide some support (especially Group B) that using
the habituat ion-dishabituation paradigm might be problematic for
revealing whether or not infants have preconceived notions of object
permanence. These results do not preclude the possibility that infants
have the ability to detect physically impossible events, but
they
caution researchers using the habituation paradigm to control
for
possible familiarity effects.
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Research currently underway in our lab is beginning to investigate
controlling for familiarity effects by modifying the habituation trials
of the moving paddle paradigm. Specifically, we are habituating infants
to a paddle movement of 150° and testing with the same 120° and 180°
test events as Baillargeon et al. (1985). If infants really do detect
physically impossible events then they should look longer to the 180°
test event. In this experiment, longer looking to the 180° event cannot
be explained by a familiarity preference because the change from the
habituation event is 30° for both the physically possible and impossible
test events.
Furthermore, the results of the current studies provide some
converging evidence that infants are operating at a perceptual level in
the violat ion-of-expectation paradigm. Bogartz, Shinsky, and Speaker
(in press) were also interested in familiarity and novelty effects in a
violation-of-expectation study by Baillargeon and Graber (1987). In
this experiment, the ability of 5.5-month-old infants to represent and
to reason about the height and trajectory of occluded objects was
tested. The infants were habituated to toy rabbits that slid back and
forth along a horizontal track whose center section was hidden by a
screen. On alternate trials, the infants saw a short or tall rabbit
slide along the track disappearing behind the screen, then reappearing
in the other side. After habituation, the upper half of the mid-section
of the screen was removed creating a window. The infants saw possible
I
and impossible test events. In the possible event, a short
rabbit moved
back and forth along the track behind the screen. This
rabbit could noc
be seen through the window. In the impossible event,
a tall rabbit
moved back and forth along the track. This rabbit's
ears were tall
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enough so that they should have been seen through the window, but in
fact they did not appear in the window when moving behind the screen.
The infants looked equally at the short and tall rabbit
habituation events but looked significantly longer at the impossible
than at the possible test event. Baillargeon and Graber suggested that
the infants were able to represent the height of each rabbit behind the
screen. Furthermore, the infants assumed that each rabbit continued to
pursue a line of movement behind the screen that was started on the side
of the screen and therefore, expected the tall rabbit to appear in the
screen window. When the rabbit failed to appear in the window the
infants were surprised and showed greater looking time at this event.
Bogartz et al., (in press) developed a theoretical position that
what was driving the infants to look during the test trials in
Baillargeon and Graber (1987) was not the realization that an impossible
event occurred, but rather a weighted combination of various aspects of
visual processing that underlie looking behavior. Bogartz et al., cite
such capabilities as: fixating, tracking, scanning, encoding of
immediate and long-term representations, and comparison of immediate
representations with long-term representations. According to Bogartz et
al., these basic relatively well understood perceptual capabilities
allow the infant to visually perceive the world and are sufficient
mechanisms to explain the test trial looking without assuming high level
cognitive abilities such as reasoning and drawing inferences about
occluded objects.
In the Event Set x Event Set design, Bogartz et al . ,
used three
different habituation events: (1) a tall rabbit moving
back and forth
behind a screen with no window (standard habituation
event); (2) a tall
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rabbit that moved behind a screen with the window removed which infants
to see the rabbit in the window ("possible event"); and ( 3 ) a tall
rabbit that moved behind the screen with the window removed, however the
infants were not able to see the rabbit in the window ("impossible
event"). All infants were then tested with: (1) a tall rabbit moving
behind the screen; ( 2 ) a tall rabbit that moved behind the screen with
the window removed allowing the infants to see the rabbit; and ( 3 ) a
tall rabbit that moved behind the screen with the window removed but the
infants were not able to see the rabbit in the window.
This research design allowed for the exploration of the influence
of a number of different variables that might affect looking times
during the test trials (e.g., change in event from habituation to test;
whether an event is possible; whether a change from habituation to test
involved a change from no window to window, or any other possible
construct the researcher might theorize has an affect on looking time)
.
Because one can develop many different hypotheses using this design, a
^0 Sg3jpQber can pit different theories of infants' looking against one
another using multiple regression analysis.
Bogartz et al., report several findings that have implications for
the familiarity hypothesis. Bogartz et al., suggested that if infants
came to the lab with prior expectations about what events were possible
or impossible then one might reasonably expect them to take longer
to
habituate to the impossible than the possible. The results indicated
that infants habituated to possible and impossible conditions
showed no
differences in accumulated looking times to the events.
Furthermore,
the results indicated that the impossibility of the
rabbit not showing
during the window test condition did not lead to an
increase in looking
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by the infants. In fact, the possible-impossible distinction appeared
to play no role in infants looking. It should be pointed out that the
results of Bogartz et al. did indicate that changes in events from
habituation to test (such as change from window to no window or rabbit
to no rabbit in the window) elicited increased looking. This particular
finding is not in accord with the familiarity hypothesis. The
familiarity hypothesis would predict that the infants would look longer
at a perceptually familiar event, yet Bogartz et al. are finding that
when there is a visual change in the apparatus the infants show
increased looking. Research currently underway in Bogartz' lab applying
the event set x event set design to the moving paddle paradigm might
give clues as to why there were no familiarity preferences.
Despite the discrepancy between the present study and the work of
Bogartz et al., the findings of our respective research programs provide
building support for perceptual explanations for infants' looking during
violation-of-expectation procedures. It is agreeed that infants'
looking times in these paradigms are in part the result of comparing
immediate representations with stored representations and not supportive
of higher level cognitive processes such as reasoning and drawing
inferences as theorized by Baillargeon and Spelke.
B. Final Comments
Future research and theoretical speculation about precocious
abilities need to take into account several issues above and
beyond the
methodological concerns focused upon in this dissertation.
Specifically, do infants have the neurological underpinnings
to support
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sophisticated cognitive functioning early in life? Can research
paradigms other than the violation-of
-expectation paradigm be created to
provide converging evidence for such precocious abilities?
On a broader level, an account of what is meant by infants having
knowledge of the physical world needs to be explicitly addressed, as
well as an account of how infants' knowledge fits into larger
epistemological schemes. How is Spelke's nativistic theory of the
origins of knowledge rooted in the philosophical theories of Descartes
and Kant? Descartes was concerned with establishing indubitable
principles (e.g., notion of self as a thinking being, innate ideas of
identity, and God) upon which to build a theory of knowledge. Kant was
interested in developing an account of the possibility of knowledge.
The innate categories merely provide structure for a morass of sense-
data impinging itself on the mind. Knowledge itself was derived from
the resulting order of the categories but one should not confuse this
order with knowledge.
When Spelke and Baillargeon speak of early knowledge, do they mean
some understanding (which implies the infant posses beliefs and
intentions) in a declarative sense? This view would be difficult to
establish without a paradigm that requires infants to act on some
physical phenomenon to express beliefs and intentions. Do they follow
the lead of Kant and mean by knowledge that the mind automatically
structures incoming information on an unconscious level without any
effort? This view might be more readily acceptable by a greater
number of theorists because the brain/mind necessarily constrains
information in many ways. For example, information is
constrained by
the five senses (one cannot sense in ways different
than these senses);
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the visual system necessarily constrains visual perception to 3-
dimensions and to a small band of the light spectrum; and the mind
cannot understand that 2+3=6. Similarly, infants' minds/brains
might be able to constrain perceptual information in certain ways so
that they perceive a stable organized world. Such perceptual
capabilities do not necessarily need to be conscious and they do not
need to be considred knowledge per se . but they can certainly provide a
foundation for knowledge. Whatever view one has of the nature of
knowledge, attempts at clarifying what exactly is meant by infants
having "knowledge" would pay great dividends to psychologists interested
in the acquisition of knowledge and perhaps lead to a unified effort in
theorizing about early perception and cognition.
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